



# What Works to Prevent Violence Research & Innovation Programme

## Mid-term and End-term Performance Evaluation

### Mid-term Review

DFID  
April, 2017

Violence against Women and Girls Team, Inclusive Societies Dept, Policy Division and Governance, Conflict and Social Development Team, Research and Evidence Division

## Executive Summary

This is the Mid Term Review (MTR) report of the DFID-funded, What Works to Prevent Violence Against Women and Girls programme. Our evaluation objectives are, to:

- Evaluate the programme's performance against the overall programme outputs and outcomes at the mid-term and end of the programme;
- Assess the quality of the research outputs, as this can impinge significantly on uptake;
- Assess the extent to which evidence is being used to a) inform decisions to invest in end-VAWG policies and programmes in the global south and b) to maximise uptake.

IMC Worldwide was commissioned, in partnership with the University of Portsmouth (UoP) and CommsConsult, to design and deliver the mid-term (March 2017). Following almost immediately after the September – December 2016 inception phase, the evaluation team began the MTR in late January 2017 and finished on the 10<sup>th</sup> March 2017. This MTR timeline was very compressed, at the request of DFID, to provide information for DFID's Annual Review (AR) of the programme.

The core team consists of Dr. Sheena Crawford (Team Leader), Dr Tamsin Bradley (Research Lead, University of Portsmouth - UoP), and Megan Lloyd-Laney (Research Uptake Lead; CommsConsult). Kate Conroy (Evaluation Specialist, IMC Worldwide), Professor Ruth Pearson (Professor Emerita, University of Leeds), and Dr Zara Ramsay (UoP) are additional evaluation team members, and Laura French-Constant (CommsConsult) provided Research Uptake (RU) inputs.

### MTR activities overview

This MTR builds on our Inception Report (January 2017). It draws on core team visits to the Secretariat and project levels in South Africa and Kenya; consultations in Pakistan; a series of Key Actor Interviews (KAIs) across key stakeholders, a literature review and presentation of findings to DFID in March 2017.

### Evaluation Framework

Finalised during the early MTR stage the evaluation design comprises four main components: ToC and logframe review; evaluation questions; evaluation methodological overview; and data analysis and synthesis.

#### 1. ToC and logframe review

Lack of coherence between the component ToCs and WW level ToC (from the DFID business case and which components were reportedly unaware of), has limited the usefulness of the ToC to be promote synergies between component and surface gaps.

A general perception amongst component partners is that the DFID ToC and logframe were too rigid to be of use and inapplicable at the individual component level: representing more of a '*funding requirement*' than being a useful programme management tool. While partners are receptive to changes to the ToC (and were part of a November 2016 workshop on this with the evaluation team), there is no appetite amongst partners to make further changes to the logframe, in particular. That being said, it would be a shame to not capture in the results framework, some key results of the WW programme that are not currently represented in the

results framework. We suggest a middle path, with the addition of some new intermediate outcomes that map possible WW trajectories earlier in the project impact pathway.

## 2. Evaluation Questions

Based on OECD DAC criteria, our valuation questions were finalised and agreed in the early MTR phase and represent the core focus areas of the evaluation.

## 3. Evaluation Methods

Our evaluation method sets out how we planned to gather and analyse data to enable us to respond to the evaluation questions. In brief, our method consisted of **five** key components:

- i. **A literature review** – including an audit of WW documents, review and analysis of key programmes addressing VAWG, review of wider VAWG literature.
- ii. **Case Studies** - Mapped against agreed criteria, CS in Pakistan, South Africa and Kenya were undertaken, with in-country visits to Kenya and South Africa.
- iii. **KAIs** – during the MTR, the team interviewed 33 Component / Secretariat / Project Implementer staff, 10 DFID staff, and 19 others (independent experts).
- iv. **Adapted Research Excellence & Uptake Framework** – using the Research Excellence Framework (REF) as a basis, we added RU dimensions and developed working definitions of each dimension. At this mid-term stage, we analysed research processes and RU activities and reviewed progress towards these ratings.
- v. **Development of new monitoring and analysis methods** – such as the Positive Pathways method described in [Annex 1](#).

## 4. Data Analysis and Synthesis

Our framework is based on a realist inspired and RU focus framework, and on the need to assess performance rather than impact. To support our analysis and synthesis we developed / assessed, as an on-going process: our understanding of the stakeholder and political economy environment at all levels; the quality of research given the realities of the context and review of uptake strategies and possibilities in each context; the effectiveness and appropriateness in which the research is being communicated for uptake; and synthesised evidence to develop a story regarding what they evidence tells us in terms of what works? What positive pathways can we map out based on the research generated by What Works?

### Limitations

A number of limitations restrict our methodological approach. These include: the impact of the compressed MTR timeframe in general but also regarding obtaining full ethical approval for field level evaluation activities; access to project level sites for security reasons (for one case study we could only undertake interviews by skype); our confidence in the ability to generalise the results given the complex nature of WW programme and the limited number of case studies undertaken.

### Research quality and processes – an overview of findings

Our findings point to high quality and rigorous research processes across all components. While findings are only just emerging there is already evidence that the research is generating new and important insights. Significant attention has been placed on training in-country researchers and quality control procedures are strict. Problems in the way in which data is collected are identified quickly and addressed. It is anticipated that the programme will leave research capacity strengthening in-country expertise in researching VAWG. In some instances relationships between researchers across the north and south is strained, if a strong commitment to co-publish is asserted and maintained these tensions will ease.

## Research Uptake – an overview of findings

A good start has been made to articulate and enshrine strategic approaches to research uptake (RU) – including development of RU strategies, stakeholder mapping, dedicated TA with a mandate to support RU for C1, and a Secretariat with a mandate to coordinate across the three components. Stakeholders in the programme are highly experienced in influencing policy and practice with research. The challenge is how to systematise and embed this experience and approach throughout the programme, and how to leverage the strong reputations of the organisations involved – and their Advisory Groups - in WW.

There is increasing need as the programme passes the half-way point, for a gearing up and amplification of RU efforts to ensure that the evidence being generated by the programme realises its full potential. High level support for and facilitation of these strategic activities, at all levels (project, components, programme) needs to be explicit and purposeful, including active monitoring of progress against activities, reflection and learning across the programme, to ensure WW-wide buy-in and commitment to this area of work. Dedicated – and potentially additional – resources will need to be allocated to three out of the four areas of RU (RU capacity, strategic communications and engagement) to ensure RU Strategy objectives are met.

### Other key findings include:

**What Works is an ambitious and exciting programme with bold architecture and modalities, and it uses innovative approaches.**

Globally, until WW, approaches to reducing and preventing VAWG have tended to be piecemeal and fractured. The three components of WW offer a unique opportunity to develop understanding of what is needed to [prevent](#) VAWG, [protect](#) women and girls and [promote](#) better response across policy and programming environments. Innovation is key, throughout the programme.

**Lessons are being learned that will be useful across the global community with high potential to shape donor investment over next 5-10 years.**

At mid-term, the indications are that learning being generated through WW, and to be generated throughout the rest of this programme phase, will set the framework for end-VAWG policy and programming over the next decade. Phase 1 of the programme focuses on Intimate Partner Violence (IPV), and sexual violence by non-partners. However, learning will reach across the VAWG environment to encompass wider aspects of Gender-Based Violence, including Harmful Traditional Practices (HTP).

**WW is stimulating development of a Community of Practice (CoP) between research and intervention. This CoP spills beyond the programme.**

The programme has needed to focus on capacity development of partner organisations to a far greater extent than originally anticipated in programme design. In C1, the need to strengthen intervention and research/evaluation approaches, sometimes to the extent of bringing implementation and evaluation organisations together, has led to valuable opportunities to build a meaningful CoP and opportunities to catalyse a wide range of actors.

WW establishes DFID as a 'brand' leader in the end-VAWG and RU fields, with clear actions that can be taken to leverage this position.

Investment in WW is showing positive returns which will help to consolidate DFID's (and the UK Government's) leadership in the field of end-VAWG. DFID has an important role to play in helping to push for RU and to get end-VAWG firmly onto the policy agenda. With its current and developing portfolio on adolescent girls and young women, their health and well-being, DFID is well-placed to influence governments and other donors through a variety of international fora.

The WW programme has done well in progressing towards generating a programme wide body of work, despite the components being contracted separately

Despite having been commissioned by DFID as three separate programmes of work (with their own objectives, management and contractual arrangements, RU strategies and ways of working), the programme has developed a WW brand, and body of evidence, with the potential to leverage change at a higher level than components would have been able to achieve, individually.

The programme would benefit from further development of the coordination and cross-learning between the three components.

The three components work well together, but the design of the programme and current management mandates mean that this is more due to their desire and willingness to work together than because it is a requirement. Budget adjustments have been made so that C1 has more money available for work which unites the three components and builds the synergies expected by DFID.

The complexity and ambition of the programme presents many challenges.

Programme partners often work in difficult and adversarial contexts, seeking to generate and promote evidence in contexts where there may be limited political will to address all aspects of VAWG, particularly Intimate Partner Violence (IPV). Building evidence, and getting it seen and discussed, influencing decision-makers at all levels and academic thinking, and informing programming and practice, may be possible with an explicit and strategic RU push.

## Recommendations

Recommendations include:

### General and Management

1. Ensure the ASM is designed in ways which will promote synergies between the three programme components.
2. Develop a strategic approach to capturing the processes of innovation across the whole programme.
3. Further the role of champions in each country to ensure that they fully support all aspects of innovation and research uptake.

### Research

4. Develop strategies to share, whenever and wherever possible, findings of research as soon as they emerge, catalyse a wide range of actors and strengthen the Community of Practice.
5. Encourage intra-country and cross-country drafting and editing of outputs to increase both the number and type of products and the cooperation between north and south.

## Research Uptake

6. Further promote the IAB and TAGs as active champions of RU and appoint an RU expert to the Independent Advisory Board
7. Ensure that DFID takes on its responsibilities for driving RU and promoting WW in the political spaces where it has leverage
8. Strengthen the RU role in the Secretariat to Director level and strengthen the RU mandate in the components. Ensure adequate RU resourcing
9. Strengthen the public facing platform and make more aggressive and concerted use of 'cost neutral' communications channels such as social media.

## Monitoring and Evaluation

10. Discuss the proposed revisions to the over-arching ToC and logframe and ensure ownership by all components
11. Strengthen M&E for assessment of impact and sustainability
12. Track WW impact, within DFID, through channels such as the VAWG helpdesk

# Acronyms

AKU	Aga Khan University
AR	Annual Review
ASM	Annual Scientific Meeting
CS	Case Study
CMO	Context Mechanism Outcome
CoP	Community of Practice
DFID	Department for International Development
EQ	Evaluation Question/s
EQuALS	Evaluation Quality Assurance and Learning Services
ETR	End-term Review
GBV	Gender Based Violence
IAB	Independent Advisory Board
ICAI	Independent Commission for Aid Impact
IPV	Intimate Partner Violence
IRC	International Rescue Committee
KAI	Key Actor Interview
LSHTM	London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MTR	Mid-term Review
OECD-DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development - Development Assistance Committee
OM	Outcome Mapping
QA	Quality Assurance
R2A	Research to Action
REF	Research Excellence Framework
RL	Research Lead
ROA	Rapid Outcome Assessment
RU	Research Uptake
SAMRC	South African Medical Research Council
SDD	Social Development Direct
SEQAS	Specialist Evaluation and Quality Assurance Services
TL	Team Leader
ToC	Theory of Change
ToR	Terms of Reference
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNFPA	United Nations Population Fund
UoP	University of Portsmouth
VAWG	Violence against Women and Girls
VfM	Value for Money
WEE	Women's Economic Empowerment
WHO	The World Health Organisation
WW	What Works

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# 1 Introduction

This is the Mid Term Review (MTR) report of the DFID-funded, What Works to Prevent Violence Against Women and Girls programme. Founded on the core principle of generating both accountability and learning key lessons, our evaluation objectives remain as they were outlined at technical submission and are to:

- Evaluate the programme's performance against the overall programme outputs and outcomes at the mid-term and end of the programme;
- Assess the quality of the research outputs as this can impinge significantly on uptake;
- Assess to what extent that evidence is being used to inform decisions to invest in end-VAWG policies and programmes in the global south; and to maximise uptake.

This MTR builds on our Inception Report (January 2017), core team visits to the Secretariat and project level in South Africa and to the project level in Kenya, consultations in Pakistan, and on a series of Key Actor Interviews (KAIs) across key stakeholders. It also draws on a literature review and presentation of findings to DFID in March 2017.

*'The task of the independent evaluation team is to assess to what extent that evidence is being used to inform decisions to invest in VAWG policies and programmes in the global south.'*

Evaluation ToR, DFID December 2015

The (revised) terms of reference (ToR) can be found in [Annex 2](#).

## 1.1. Overview of the WW Mid-Term Evaluation

### Background to the What Works Mid-term Review

IMC Worldwide was commissioned, in partnership with the University of Portsmouth (UoP) and CommsConsult, to design and deliver the mid-term (March 2017) and Final Performance Evaluations (July 2019) of the WW Programme, and three six-monthly reviews of research uptake (September 2017, March 2018, September 2018). Following almost immediately after the September – December 2016 inception phase, the evaluation team began the MTR in late January 2017 and finished on the 10<sup>th</sup> March 2017. This MTR timeline was very compressed, at the request of DFID, to provide information for DFID's Annual Review (AR) of the programme.

The core team consists of Dr. Sheena Crawford (Team Leader), Dr Tamsin Bradley (Research Lead, University of Portsmouth - UoP), and Megan Lloyd-Laney (Research Uptake Lead; CommsConsult). Kate Conroy (Evaluation Specialist, IMC Worldwide), Professor Ruth Pearson (Professor Emerita, University of Leeds), and Dr Zara Ramsay (UoP) are additional evaluation team members, and Laura French-Constant (CommsConsult) provided Research Uptake (RU) inputs.

## 1.2. Revisions to the Original Mid-Term Objectives

**Implications of compressing the MTR timeline** – It was originally planned to carry out the MTR in June 2017. However, upon request from DFID, the timing of the mid-term was brought

forward to March 2017 to allow for findings and recommendations from the MTR to feed into the WW Annual Review (AR). DFID has agreed that the MTR will be 'light-touch' because of the compressed timeline. They have developed an accompanying document to explain the rationale for this to DFID's evaluation QA EQuALs process.

**Less depth in case studies** – the short time available for the MTR has also meant that we have had to narrow our ambitions for the country case studies. Most significantly, there was no time to gain full ethical clearance (see [Section 3.5](#) on limitations), which meant that we could not carry out any consultations with constituents in the project areas (whether they were project participants or not). The case studies on Pakistan and Dadaab, presented in annexes 8 and 9, will be worked up over the course of the programme. Information gained during the MTR visit to South Africa will contribute to a Case Study to be presented in the Endline Evaluation. At endline, all case studies will demonstrate the programme's progress in developing the WW's approach to innovation, research and research uptake.

**Refocused evaluation objectives** – an original activity of the mid-term was to 'identify what information the three components already collect as part of their monitoring and evaluation systems'. Other topics were seen as priorities, and given the compressed timeframe, it was agreed with DFID that this would be reduced to a simple "traffic lights" table of progress against outcomes and outputs.

### 1.3. Intended Audience

To increase accountability, ensure wide lesson learning and strengthen the programme, there are several target audiences for the evaluation:

- WW implementing partners at the secretariat, component and project level
- DFID and the Independent Advisory Board of What Works, country level project advisory groups, and component-specific technical advisory groups
- Independent Commission for Aid Impact (ICAI) and other accountability bodies
- Potential future co-funders of WW, and Research and Evaluation organisations, civil society organisations and think-tanks

Our evaluation communication strategy to engage with these partners is found in [Section 7](#).

### 1.4. Report Structure

This report is broken down into the following seven sections. A short description is provided below.

- |                               |  |
|-------------------------------|--|
| <a href="#">Section One</a>   | Introduction to this report and outline of structure.  |
| <a href="#">Section Two</a>   | Overview of the WW programme   |
| <a href="#">Section Three</a> | Presentation of the evaluation framework: describes the approach taken and the methods used in data collection and analysis. Key activities are described along with a narrative of limitations, challenges and risks encountered. |
| <a href="#">Section Four</a>  | Revisions to the programme ToC and overarching programme logframe are proposed.  |
| <a href="#">Section Five</a>  | Over-arching findings from the MTR are presented here. Wider findings  |

are then analysed and organised under the DAC evaluation criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability, with equity issues running throughout. The two major outcome topics of WW: Research Uptake (RU) and Innovation, are discussed.

**Section Six** Recommendations to DFID, with opportunities and suggestions for strengthening programme approach.

**Section Seven** Next steps for the evaluation. We discuss how to communicate the evaluation findings and the value of the evaluation team attending the ASM 2017. We give an outline of our proposed format for the six-monthly check-ins.

## 2 Overview of the WW Programme

Section 2 provides a brief overview to the full What Works (WW) programme, including the evaluation component (Component 4).

### Background to the What Works to Prevent Violence Programme

The WW programme (September 2013 – April 2019)<sup>1</sup> has the following aims:

- **Impact:** improved policies and expanded programmes reduce the prevalence of VAWG and increase the number of women and girls receiving quality prevention and response services in at least 10 DFID priority countries
- **Outcome:** Improved investment in VAWG policies and programmes across the global south
- The delivery of these objectives is being carried out through three separate but interrelated components, with learning between them being led by the South Africa Medical Research Council (SA MRC). The three components will all feed into wider goals around reducing poverty and social inequalities. Poverty and social inequality are known to trigger VAWG (though poverty is not an automatic driver).

*'Working on a larger scale than would be possible without the support of a major donor, the What Works consortium includes some of the most widely cited researchers in the field. ...No other donor has invested comparable resources into VAWG research. In our interviews with other donors and NGOs, those who were aware of What Works gave feedback that this is a highly respected initiative with the potential to make a major contribution to knowledge in the field.'*

ICAI (2016), DFID's efforts to eliminate violence against women and girls: A learning review
- **Component 1 (C1):** Prevention of VAWG led by SA MRC, which funds 10 innovation grants to test new approaches to prevent VAW and impact evaluations for 7 existing programmes across selected countries in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. C1 has a budget of £17.8 million.
- **Component 2 (C2):** VAWG in conflict and humanitarian emergencies, led by the International Rescue Committee, to conduct in-depth research studies on the drivers, prevalence, trends over time and effective prevention and response mechanisms, for VAWG in conflict and humanitarian emergencies. The work comprises six case studies: South Sudan, Kenya, DRC, the Philippines, a study on state-building and peacebuilding (Nepal, Sierra Leone, and South Sudan) plus one other research study on the impact of cash transfer programming on women's protection outcomes in an acute emergency. C2 has a budget of £5 million. Conflict has caused interruptions to research in South Sudan (which has now been undertaken).
- **Component 3 (C3):** Economic and social costs of VAWG in developing countries. This component tests new methodologies to assess the economic and social costs of VAWG, through three empirical studies in South Sudan, Ghana and Pakistan, and is expected to create synergies with C1 and C2. C3 has a budget of £1.5 million.

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<sup>1</sup> Hereafter called the WW Programme.

- **Component 4:** The WW Independent Evaluation (IE) will undertake an ‘overview’, performance assessment of all three components. The assessment comprises a mid-term review and end-term final evaluation, as well as six-monthly check-ins with implementing partners of the three components on how their M&E systems to capture research uptake are operating. The IE has a total budget of £400,000 for all deliverables.

## 2.1. An Overview of the What Works Programme architecture

The architecture of the programme has had significant effect (mostly positive) on the effectiveness of the programme (which is discussed in [Section 5.4](#)).

### Programme Architecture

The What Works to Prevent Violence against Women and Girls Research and Innovation Fund business case was approved in February 2013 (DFID 2013). The programme was designed to be carried out through a combination of three related but distinct research components, each addressing evidence gaps identified by DFID. A set of TORs was drawn up against the business case, with staggered timelines<sup>2</sup> (including revised contract dates).

Contract amendments took place in 2016. These amendments extended the timeline for C3 in line with C1 and C2, and increased resources for C1 (for cross-component work) and for C2 to undertake cross-component RU activities. The inception phases finished at different times during 2014, and between C1 and C3 there was almost no overlap in inception periods, so no time for planning of cross-working before full implementation began. In terms of management by DFID, C1 and C3 are managed by DFID Inclusive Societies Department, while C2 is managed by DFID’s Research and Evidence Division (RED). This means there are separate DFID Senior Responsible Officers for the components, and there has been a high level of staff turnover. This has meant that an amount of institutional memory has been lost and time has been needed to ensure that new staff are up to speed.

The programme components were designed to be operationally and contractually separate. This was to allow for adequate concentration on the three distinct areas of research. Cross-working between components was a key consideration in programme design in order that *“coherence across components reduces duplication and enables synergies for synthesis and cross-learning”* (DFID 2013: 34).

The risk of lack of coherence across the programme, as a result of the contracting method, was identified in the design phase. The potential for duplication, inability to synthesise across the programme, and loss of opportunity for building on lessons and emerging findings, was recognised. In order to mitigate this risk, cross-learning was built into each component ToR, with C1 holding overall responsibility for learning and synthesis across the three components. The aim was to ensure that component budgets were sufficient to allow for cross-learning. The Independent Advisory Board (IAB) and SMRC were tasked with providing guidance, and DFID was to support and promote cross-learning through monitoring and management processes.

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<sup>2</sup> It is not clear why start times were staggered. However, as with other multi-component programmes, it makes programming sense to ensure that the major component (in terms of spend) can start effectively before commits funds to other components.

## 2.2. Programme Context

Globally, movements to improve the lives, health and well-being of girls and women have grown in power over recent years. The voices of Southern women have always been strong in this struggle but gradually they are now being heard – by their own people and governments and by foreign governments, donors and organisations. Increasingly, the movement against all forms of violence against women and girls is Southern-led. The UK, and other “Western” countries have much to learn from the Southern movements. There has been a growing agenda within DFID, and externally to DFID, to hold duty-bearers to account on supporting interventions that tackle VAWG. Table 1 provides an overview of some key dates and related activities.

Table 1: Relevant core DFID related VAWG dates

DFID VAWG – Relevant Core Dates	
2011	DFID’s Business Plan 2012-2015 identifies VAWG as a priority and commits DFID to establish a research and innovation fund by December 2012
2012	Theory of Change on Ending Violence Against Women and Girls
2013	Strategic Vision for Girls and Women (new version)
2013	DFID Business Case: Violence Against Women and Girls Research and Innovation Fund (February 2013)
2014	Girl Summit (with UNICEF, on FGM/C and Child Marriage), London
2014	ICAI released on ‘How DFID learns’ (DFID 2014)
2016	ICAI – DFID’s Efforts to Eliminate Violence Against Women and Girls (DFID May 2016) DFID’s Response to ICAI – DFID’s Efforts to Eliminate Violence Against Women and Girls (DFID May 2016)

DFID engaged early in work on prevention of violence against women. In the last six years, attention has returned to ending VAWG, and DFID is now recognised globally as a leader in this space. DFID is considered a thought leader in VAWG research and has invested significantly (£67m) in research programmes around VAWG, in addition to smaller-scale evaluations across its portfolio. Beyond the WW programme, DFID is also funding *inter alia*, the £35m Towards Ending FGM/C in Africa and Beyond programme, the £12m Sudan Free from FGC programme, the £3m Child, Early and Forced Marriage programme and the £31m Global Girls Research Initiative (2014-2014).

There is considerable external pressure on DFID to respond to the VAWG challenge. DFID is responding: for the follow up review to its 2016 study on DFID’s efforts to eliminate VAWG planned to take place later this year by ICAI, DFID have undertaken an internal knowledge management review of their VAWG team and are currently producing a VAWG Learning Strategy.<sup>3</sup>


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<sup>3</sup> Both unseen by the evaluation team.

### 3 Evaluation Design

The evaluation design comprises four main components (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Evaluation Design Components



#### 3.1. Theory of Change (ToC)

During inception we assessed the various ToCs of each component as well as DFID's overarching programme ToC. In the Inception Report, gaps were identified in the design and use of the WW ToC. It was agreed in the November Inception Workshop between WW implementers, the evaluation team and DFID, that we would support the development of a revised programme level WW ToC with which all relevant stakeholders could feel comfortable. In Section 4, below we present our proposed new ToC taking into account the differing characteristics, aims and objectives of each component. From the revised ToC we have developed a revised programme log-frame, also presented in Section 4. These are now for the programme and DFID to take forward, revise (as needed), own and use. We are happy to support this process but also recognise the importance of participation and ownership in the process from DFID and the programme.

#### 3.2. Evaluation Questions

Our proposed evaluation questions were presented during the Inception Phase and have been revised in light of comments received. The questions frame our realist and research-uptake lens that then feed into the specific approaches we are taking to data collection and analysis. Questions are organised around the DAC criteria of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability, with the cross-cutting issue of equity running throughout. We present the evaluation questions at the head of each sub-section.



### 3.3. Evaluation Methodological Overview

Annex 3 provides a wider overview of our evaluation framework, which underpins and shapes our methodological approach in terms of the questions, types of data and the lens through which we analyse evidence.

#### Realist Evaluation Lens

Our methodology combines two critical perspectives through which different forms of data will be collected and analysed. These perspectives are realism and research uptake. The analysis will then feed into the creation of positive pathways, which will contribute to better programming for prevention of, and ending, VAWG (more details below).

A realist approach to evaluation is increasingly popular with donors such as DFID.<sup>4</sup> While we did not propose or apply the realist model in its pure form, we drew from it elements that support our evaluation objectives in a pragmatic way. The realist approach is theory driven, applying a critical lens, which allowed us to understand how knowledge is generated and used to influence social change. WW as a whole has a number key goals, which are to generate evidence that:

1. Fills gaps in knowledge about the ecology of VAWG.
2. Prove certain interventions work to change harmful behaviours.
3. Evidence that the economic cost of failing to end VAWG is high and this, in turn, leverages more resource and commitment across sectors.

WW components stress that, even with high quality evidence, leveraging policy and programme change is neither straightforward nor inevitable. Bringing the use of evidence into policy and programming is a non-linear, context-dependent process. We worked with this reality by applying a research uptake lens that will guide us in mapping the stakeholder environment and in identifying opportunities for uptake. We will continue, across the lifetime of the programme, to work with components to understand how they have and/or intend to strategize for RU.

The realist approach acknowledges the importance of context. During inception and mid-term we have worked with implementers to gain an understanding of the complex political and economic ecology of decision-making across all programme contexts. This knowledge is needed across the diverse contexts in which WW is operating, as understanding the politics of decision-making will support the strategic design of effective pathways for uptake. We explored how pathways for evidence into action, relationships built and the generation of national appetite for change worked to propel WW towards its final goal - a reduction in VAWG.

Our data builds an analytical picture of the connectivity of the WW programme itself at country and global levels and capture its reach of influence with stakeholders outside the WW community. A key focus: are the same themes emerging across country data sets?

#### Method

In brief, our method for this MTR consisted of five key components:

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<sup>4</sup> See [www.ramesesproject.org](http://www.ramesesproject.org) for more details on the realist approach.

1. **A literature review** – including an audit of WW documents, review and analysis of key programme, and VAWG, literature.<sup>5</sup>
2. **Case Studies** - While recognising that the evaluation is focused at the programme level, case studies (CS) across various contexts and components are being carried out to generate detailed data and lessons. Mapped against agreed criteria, CS in Pakistan, South Africa and Dadaab in Kenya are currently being undertaken and are completed to different depth and detail. In-country visits to Kenya and South Africa have been conducted as part of the MTR and further interviews with key actors conducted in Pakistan. The rationale for our CS selection is detailed in Annex 3 and a summary is offered below. Time and budget constraints were significant in the selection of CS for this evaluation. We aimed to cover aspects of all components (C1, C2 and C3) but, owing to time constraints, we could not cover examples of the full range of interventions across the whole programme. Our selection of Case Studies was based on the need to optimise learning and VFM, making full use of: a) work already begun during the inception phase, b) contacts with WW projects and c) travel planned for evaluation team members. In all CS, full attention was given to issues of inclusion and disaggregation of data. We focused on assessing whether/how people of different ages, socio-economic backgrounds, living with disabilities etc., are included in the interventions and whether/how data and understandings generated were disaggregated with inclusion and diversity issues made explicit. We were not able to visit Dadaab (security reasons), and were not able to consult participants in South Africa (no time to get ethical clearance), so our assessment of the extent to which diversity is addressed is, in part, based on personal communication from trusted external experts.
3. **KAIs** – during the evaluation the team interviewed 33 Component / Secretariat/ Project Implementer staff, 10 DFID staff, and 19 other (independent experts/ non-WW stakeholders).
4. **Adapted Research Excellence & Uptake Framework** – using the Research Excellence Framework (REF) as a basis, we added RU dimensions and developed working definitions of each dimension (Table 2 below). Together with this, we developed corresponding draft provisional ratings that will be used in the final evaluation to rank WW's research and research uptake. At this mid-term stage, we analysed research processes and RU activities and reviewed progress towards these ratings.
5. **Development of new monitoring and analysis methods** – as our relationship with the programme develops, we are looking for ways to assist in getting maximum understanding on what works to prevent VAWG. The richness and diversity of the WW programme has already led to development of one new analysis method. We believe this method will be important for future programming and will help to measure sustainability of achievements. The Positive Pathways method is described in accompanying Annex 1.

### Research Excellence & Uptake – Working Definitions

Reviewing the trajectory of the WW programme: from the initial planning of research to the production of evidence, to eventual uptake of that evidence, and based on existing frameworks (such as the REF), we have developed corresponding dimensions to capture core aspects of the programme for review. We provide working definitions of these in Table 2 below.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> Please note that during the inception phase of the evaluation a literature review of research uptake, impact of research, and evidence-informed policy and programming and WW evidence review were undertaken.

<sup>6</sup> We welcome feedback on these research quality and uptake categories and hope to test these further prior to final evaluation.

Table 2: Research Excellence &amp; Uptake Working Definitions

Dimension	Working Definitions
Research / Evidence Significance	Evidence triggers a paradigm shift in how VAWG issues are researched, thought about and used.
Evidence Reach	Amount of data collected is sizable enough to trigger a shift in perspective and/or to leverage commitment to approach VAWG programming/policy in a particular way.
Research / Evidence Rigour	High quality data collected, analysed and used, with robust processes of quality control and in built checks and balances.
Evidence Impact/ Outcome	High quality evidence, synthesis, packaging and communication setting the best possible foundation for influencing policy and programme change, with an awareness that impact can be unexpected or sudden.
RU Capacity	Research uptake is acknowledged as an important part of the research cycle at both individual and institutional levels. Resources and staff capacity to undertake demand-driven, feasible and flexible research uptake planning and related activities are present within the research and implementation teams.
RU Strategy	High quality and context-appropriate RU plans including regular reflective processes and flexible engagement timelines, which are feasible to implement, and responsive to actual and emerging demand.
Engagement	Demand-driven engagement with the key stakeholders of research at all levels, which is systematically designed, feasibly implemented and monitored with the purpose of iterating the engagement plans. Evidenced relationships are built, and there is increased visibility and reputation of both VAWG findings produced and organisations involved in its generation and communication.
Strategic Communications	Demand driven and innovative communications containing clearly defined policy or practice implications appropriate to the target audience. Materials are effectively synthesised, packaged and disseminated, giving due consideration to the strength of the evidence generated.

### Focus on Innovation and Research Uptake

The evaluation ToR, and further discussions with DFID during the inception and early mid-term phase, confirmed that the core focus for the performance evaluation is research uptake. For this reason, we present our approach to RU assessment. We recognise that RU cannot be viewed separately from innovation. It is the innovative architecture of the programme as a whole, and the innovation in each section which stimulate possibilities for RU. In the WW programme, the way that innovation and RU work together must be a key driver of good lesson learning and sustainability of achievements.

The RU Literature Review identifies a consensus around the factors that need to be in place within a research programme to make it most likely that findings will be used. The factors can be categorised broadly as:

- a) presence of a robust, and comprehensive, RU Strategy
- b) capacity around RU
- c) engagement, and
- d) a strategic communications approach.

We developed definitions and a metric for each of these four areas ([Table 2](#) and [Annex 3](#)). The table describes and grades the kinds of structures and activities that need to be in place to optimise research uptake. We used these criteria to critique what we found in WW. From this, we have drawn conclusions on whether the programme approach to, and delivery of, research uptake activities, is on track at this stage of the programme cycle. We have also looked at whether or not WW is likely to achieve promised outcomes in relation to innovation and RU. Specifically, we asked:

- What is the relationship between innovation and RU? Do these two aspects of the programme fully complement each other?
- Is the programme's RU strategy robust and does everyone involved know and 'own' the strategy? Is it relevant to all programme actors: in implementation, research and evaluation?
- Do all relevant actors have the capacity and resources to implement the RU strategy?
- Does the approach to RU, as defined in the strategy, cascade down from the Secretariat components and projects in a way that is complementary and supportive?
- Is the programme implementing the strategy in an efficient and effective way to date, deploying individuals and organisations smartly?
- Has the programme taken a strategic approach to engagement, including mapping and analysing key stakeholders and factoring in 'the demand side' to uptake?
- Is the programme communicating strategically with its target audiences, using platforms and producing materials that are 'fit for purpose' and engage different audiences.
- Are systems in place to monitor systematically and to reflect on what progress is (or isn't) being made towards achieving innovation and RU objectives?


We critiqued a range of public outputs across the programme using templates that draw on best practice and theory-based principles. The outputs included the What Works Website and related, but separate Wordpress, site; the social media platforms of Twitter, Facebook and Youtube; the R2P e-newsletter and the programme-wide What Works Newsletter December 2016; and a Policy Brief generated by C2 'Responding to Typhoon Haiyan'.

We analysed the stakeholder mapping carried out at both project, component and programme levels, using the information made available as part of Research Uptake plans and strategies. The results of this are given in [Annex 4](#).

### 3.4. Data Analysis & Synthesis

The diagram below provides an overview of the analytical framework we have used at MTR and intend to use at final evaluation. The framework is based on the realist and RU focus outlined above, and on the need to assess performance rather than impact.

Figure 2: WW Evaluation Analytical Framework



We developed, as an on-going process, throughout the evaluation the following:

- Understanding of the stakeholder and political economy environment at all levels. We acknowledge that these are often fast changing and in flux.
- Assessment of the quality and appropriateness of the research given the realities of the context.
- Review of uptake strategies and possibilities in each context (from local to global).
- Assessment of the effectiveness and appropriateness in which the research is being communicated for uptake (e.g. the knowledge products produced, the channels used to communicate them, the audiences targeted).
- Finally: what does the evidence tell us in terms of what works? What positive pathways can we map out based on the research generated by What Works?

### Organising Data

To organise data from the MTR, (including literature review, case studies and KAIs), we developed a simple excel-based evidence table. The purpose of the table was to house key findings from internally and externally produced relevant primary and secondary data that was relevant to the MTR. Findings were tagged against pre-defined coded by type<sup>7</sup>, which related explicitly to our proposed evaluation questions and each evidence source coded<sup>8</sup>.

Data within the table was then disaggregated by respective evaluation question coding and analysed. In addition to being of use in supporting emerging findings in the MTR, the database will be a valuable resource in the final evaluation.

### Data disaggregation

Data were disaggregated both intersectionally (age, class, ethnicity etc. of the informant) and through coding. The coding allowed for patterns in responses across demographics, but also in

<sup>7</sup> Including: Innovation, M&E, Academic Contribution, Capacity Building, Challenges / Lessons, Internal Communications & Learning, Ethics, External communications / visibility / collaboration, Governance, Programme Design, Intersectionality, Methodological rigor, Policy Influence, Political economy, Applied contribution, Practice Influence, Responsive, Scoping, Sustainability, VFM / Spending Priorities

<sup>8</sup> These included: Peer Reviewed Journal, Peer Reviewed Report, Grey Literature – Internal, Grey Literature –External, Blog etc. – Internal, Blog etc. – External, Interview Transcript – Internal and Interview Transcript – External

terms of programme involvement. An actor's position in relation to the WW programme is important. For example, the level and extent of an actor's involvement (full time or part time) needs to be considered, levels of seniority, national or global focus of their activity and remit. We have also disaggregated on whether a stakeholder is inside or outside the programme. At project level, we would have liked to gain better understanding of constituents' personal and social backgrounds (so to assess equity better). This was not possible, as ethical clearance could not be gained in time.

The main limitations to disaggregation are small and restricted sample sizes, particularly for the case studies. More case studies, and access to people in the project areas, could have deepened the breadth and depth of our analysis. The rapid nature of the evaluation meant that we were not able to gather large scale data sets but rather worked to produce in-depth and nuanced insights that were triangulated both in country and across components, where feasible.

Our data helped build an analytical picture of the extent to which the WW programme components are connected at country and global levels, and captured its reach of influence with stakeholders outside the WW community.

Intersectional analysis will only be possible when large enough data sets have emerged and this is not yet the case. Some limited triangulation has been possible.

### Evaluation Management and Quality Assurance Processes

As with the inception phase, the IMC Project Manager managed the proposed QA process. The QA hierarchy typically flows from the Evaluation Team Members to the Team Leader (TL), then to the IMC Project Manager, then the IMC Senior Technical Director, followed by submission to DFID and DFID review/ EQuALS, when appropriate.

Professor Pearson worked closely with the Research Lead to assess the quality of the WW outputs and the process through which they are generated, including ethical review.

### Ethical Approach

The Evaluation team are using the UN Evaluation Group's (2008) 'Ethical Guidelines for Evaluation' and DFID's (2011) 'Ethics Principles for Research and Evaluation' as the fundamental ethical guidelines for the evaluation. Full details can be found in [Annex 5](#). The following factors represent our ethical framework as a whole.

- **Evaluation standards:** intentionality; managing conflict of interest; appropriate interaction with participants; accuracy, transparency & reliability; critical friendship response mechanisms.
- **Practical measures:** informed consent; researcher screening, child friendliness and awareness of protocols related to children and vulnerable people; adequate reporting mechanisms; procedures for responding to participant harm; application of appropriate evaluation toolkits.
- **Procedural principles:** reference to existing data; linkage to programme objectives; implementation of specific evaluation methodology; respect for principles of participation; respect for and protection of rights, welfare, and confidentiality.

Ethical approval is needed at two levels for the evaluation: the UoP provides ethical guidance and approval for the research process as a whole<sup>9</sup> and country-level ethical approval is sought as and where required.

### Ethical Approach

**Pakistan:** Approval in Pakistan will be sought for later phases of the evaluation, if deemed needed in addition to UoP processes, through the Social Sciences and Humanities Ethics Review Board at Lahore University of Management Sciences. However, given the timeframes for the MTR, the interviews so far have been at national level.

**Dadaab:** Research in country was only at the level of senior stakeholders. No in-country approval was needed. The interviews, conducted by skype, with two case workers in Dadaab, were supported by the ethical protocols set out in the evaluation ethical SOPs and supervision was in place (the researcher was closely mentored for distress to her or her participants. A supervision session was undertaken following each interview). The protocols and the interview tool were both agreed with the IRC (C2) prior to the interviews.

**South Africa:** Research was conducted through consultations and observations with two projects funded by grants administered by the MRC: Stepping Stones, Creating Futures (SS, CF), Durban, and Sonke, Diepsloot, Johannesburg. The nature of the consultations were informal and they therefore did not need to be ethically reviewed. It is noted that in future, if more in-depth research is needed here, the evaluation team will have to plan for a two month review period to allow for a verdict through the Medical Research Council.

## 3.5. Limitations

A number of limitations restrict our methodological approach, these are set out below.

**Ethical processes** - The scope of research possible for the MTR has been limited by the time involved in getting full ethical approach approval, both through the UoP faculty ethics board and also with the necessary relevant in-country institutions and bodies. This is understandable given the compressed timeframes involved for the MTR. As we move forward, the team will plan, in advance, what data will be needed, and will submit applications for ethical clearance, in good time.

**Timeline** - The compressed time line for the MTR has limited possibilities, not just in terms of ethical approval but also the amount of field work possible. The Pakistan country lead would have liked to visit the R2P C1 project in Sindh but this was not viable in the time-scale.

**Access** - The evaluation has not been able physically to enter the Dadaab area for our Kenya case study, for security reasons. All interviews have been conducted via Skype, with a Somali-speaking interviewer.

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<sup>9</sup> See <http://www.port.ac.uk/research/ethics/>

**Ability to generalise the results** - given the complex nature of the WW programme, with many projects across three components, it would have been more rigorous to undertake more case studies at the project level. This was not possible because of budget and time constraints. The three case studies we undertook for the MTR have allowed us to generate emerging findings and lessons, but we are limited in our ability confidently to generalise findings from them.

**Sample sizes** - we were not able to gather large scale data sets but rather worked to produce in-depth and nuanced insights that were triangulated both in country and across components.

### 3.6. Core MTR activities

Core MTR activities included:

Table 3: Core Evaluation Activities – including Data Collection Activities

Timeline	Core Activity	Activities
18-19 <sup>th</sup> January 2017	Two-day workshop- Evaluation team and DFID	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Revised EQs.</li> <li>▪ Finalised Evaluation Framework.</li> <li>▪ Brainstorm on case study location and methodology.</li> </ul>
February 2017	Audit of WW programme documents	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Inventory of all available programme management/ M&amp;E documents, quarterly and annual reports.</li> </ul>
February 2017	Document Review	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Critiqued a range of public outputs across the programme using templates that draw on best practice and theory-based principles.</li> </ul>
February 2017	Stakeholder Mapping	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Analysed stakeholder mapping carried out at both project, component and programme levels, using the information made available as part of the programme Research Uptake plans and strategies.</li> </ul>
February-March 2017	Review WW uptake strategy, M&E tools	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Review of each WW component's uptake strategy, M&amp;E tools and overall cross-component uptake strategy.</li> </ul>
January-March 2017	Engagement with the WW Secretariat; C1-3; DFID	<p>On-going contact with DFID, WW component representatives, including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ C1-3 leads and other key programme and DFID stakeholders have been consulted and interviewed;</li> <li>▪ Dr Sheena Crawford, (Team Leader) and Megan Lloyd-Laney (Research Uptake Lead) attended the Management Committee meeting on 1<sup>st</sup> March 2017.</li> </ul>
February 2017	Key Actor Interviews and Consultations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Discussions held with DFID; WW Secretariat and component staff; project level staff in Pakistan, Kenya and South Africa<sup>10</sup></li> </ul>
6-27 <sup>th</sup> February 2017	Case Studies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ PEAs undertaken</li> <li>▪ Engagement with national-level WW stakeholders through country visits and Regional Case Study Leads.</li> <li>▪ Pakistan (KAIs conducted by Regional Case Study Researchers in Pakistan).</li> <li>▪ Dadaab (remote KAIs and country visit).</li> <li>▪ South Africa (country visit).</li> </ul>

<sup>10</sup> See **Annex 6** for list of stakeholders consulted/interviewed



Timeline	Core Activity	Activities
28 <sup>th</sup> February 2017	Workshop-Evaluation team	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Sharing initial findings across the team and arranged top-line findings by OECD DAC criteria.</li> </ul>
1 <sup>st</sup> March 2017	Presented preliminary findings	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Presentation of top-line findings followed by discussion with DFID What Works and wider VAWG team.</li> </ul>
March 2017	Review ToC and Logframe	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Ensure component ToCs align with WW overarching ToC</li> </ul>

## 4 Refinements to the ToC and logframe

In the autumn of 2016, as the evaluation team were beginning preparation of the Inception Report, it became clear that the WW programme was working with four active ToCs (one put forward in the DFID Business Case, and one for each of the components). This would not be a problem, if there were coherence between the three component ToCs and an overarching DFID one, but this is not the case. The DFID ToC presents only part of what works to prevent violence against women and girls, and it is set at a lower level than those with which the components work.

To discuss these issues, all four components (three programme components and the evaluation team) met for a ToC workshop on November 30<sup>th</sup> 2016. In inception interviews, and at the workshop, the three components pointed out that they were previously unaware of the original DFID ToC, and that both it, and the DFID logframe presented problems (Box 1):

### Box 1: Issues with the original DFID ToC and logframe

- There is a general perception that DFID have been too rigid in their design of the overarching ToC and logframe. These instruments are considered broadly inapplicable to individual components, which prefer to use their own internal versions to guide and track progress.
- As a result, the components now view the overarching ToC and logframe as representing a series of funding hoops, rather than as helpful/insightful documents to guide and support the research.
- Milestones in the logframe are considered excessively 'nebulous' – there is a lack of clarity in all components about how to indicate achievement. Here, the view is that C2 has had more success in discussions with DFID than C1, which remains frustrated.
- There is broad consensus that the logframe focuses excessively on outcomes at the expense of process. Notably, C2 appears to consider rapid impact more achievable than the other components.

*Source: WW ToC Workshop, London, 30 November 2016*

### 4.1. ToC & Logframe Review

The value of an overarching and realistic ToC and logframe

A programme-level ToC and logframe are necessary to:

- a) Promote synergies between all three programme components
- b) Allow for fair, realistic and full independent evaluation of programme achievements.

Without an overarching ToC and logframe there is a very real danger that the programme evaluation will fail to pick up on important programme achievements (processes and products). There is also danger that the fullness of work carried out by the programme and the richness of its successes, will not be recognised. This has happened in other complex programmes, and it is a common failing in many programmes with impacts and super-impacts related to gender equality and equity, and to wider social change. Things, for example, that would likely be lost without an overarching ToC and logframe are: [processes](#), particularly the way that innovation drives all aspects of the programme, and [products](#): capacity, developing among stakeholders, to support all programme activities, outputs and outcomes. In the original logframe, capacity to deliver the programme is presumed to exist [already](#), and the complexity of designing and

implementing innovative programming, is overlooked. These things are vital if we are to be able fully to understand what is needed to prevent and end VAWG, and how to achieve our goals.

### Critical Review of the Original ToC and Logframe

Our analysis of DFID’s original ToC has been informed by our KAIs, the round-table in November, and discussions with Professor Ruth Pearson.<sup>11</sup> Table 4, below explores what is unhelpful about the assumptions made in the original ToC.<sup>12</sup>

Table 4: Critical Review of the ToC Assumptions

DFID Business Case ToC Area/Assumption	Critical analysis emerging from the ToC round-table, KAIs and the team’s technical knowledge
New research is linked with implementation programmes.	<p>New evidence will need to be rigorous and well-argued and focus specifically on lessons learnt through the programme’s research streams, innovation projects and interventions. This requires capacity in three areas: research, design and implementation of interventions and evaluations of VAWG projects. Concerns were raised during the round-table that this capacity has been assumed in the ToRs but that a great deal of effort is being put into building it. This effort is not fully recognised in the ToC or the logframe.</p> <p>At the round-table concerns were raised that it may be unrealistic to expect WW components to build the capacity necessary to deliver high quality interventions, gather data to evidence WW convincingly and work on uptake in such a tight time-scale.</p>
Research and evaluation is procured transparently.	<p>During the round-table it was clear that a concerted effort had been made to ensure that projects and evaluators were recruited in a fair and transparent way. C1 stated that they had received 800 applications for their innovation grants. The problem, however, was not managing a transparent process but selecting sufficient projects of quality. In order to ensure a level of robustness C1 leads had to spend time supporting country partners in designing interventions and evaluation frameworks. This level of activity had not been expected from the outset. The extent to which this was also true for C2 and C3 was unclear; it may not be the case due to the different focuses for each. Again, the logframe and ToC do not capture the diversity of activities being undertaken by components.</p>
Uptake strategies are designed to communicate research	<p>Again, and as discussed at the round-table, this assumes uptake knowledge on what works exists both at programme and country level. Participants felt it was lacking and they were unsure how the skill/capacity/resource gap would be filled. It also emerged during the KAIs that some informants felt that an RU lens was missing from both the DFID and component ToCs. We recommend some refinements to the ToC and logframe to embed a clear causal RU pathway demonstrating how research should be</p>

<sup>11</sup> Please see the Evaluation Inception Report for further details.

<sup>12</sup> This was originally presented in the Inception Report, and is repeated here, for clarity.

<p>findings.</p>	<p><b>channelled strategically</b> to optimise its chances of bringing about policy change and opening up resource flows.</p> <p>It is possible that the evidence generated through the innovation grants and impact evaluations (C1) may be too context specific to generate overarching lessons that can feed into new policies and programmes elsewhere in the global south. The point was made during a DFID KAI that, <i>“it is likely that a question over how to scale up will remain.”</i></p> <p><b>Effective communication of research findings is necessary but not sufficient for research uptake.</b> It is often difficult to determine the links between research and influencing activities and subsequent changes in policy. Policy change is highly complex, and is often ill-suited to ‘linear’ or ‘rational’ models. More commonly, policy processes are shaped by a multitude of interacting forces and actors – each with their own dynamic and interests. This means that the causal links can be particularly complex to understand and measure.</p>
<p>Research Capacity Exists to implement research and evaluation.</p> <p>Research components can be added to implementation programmes.</p> <p>Rigorous methods can be developed.</p> <p>Channels exist to communicate findings.</p>	<p><b>Research capacity was unanimously questioned by all components</b> both in terms of the level of research skills in-country, and also knowledge and experience of conducted evaluations specifically on VAWG.</p> <p><b>Innovation in relation to research methods is seen as a goal for WW.</b> The bringing together of robust research tools into evaluation frames is seen by those interviewed to be necessary but challenging, not least because of the missing capacity at country level. The skill level needed for VAWG research is high due to the sensitivity and complexity of the issues surrounding it.</p> <p>The world leading expertise present in the programme (referred to in the KAI mentioned previously) means that this outcome is likely, <b>however the operationalisation of these methods will be problematic if national capacity is weak.</b></p> <p>Communication networking was introduced as topic for discussion between component leads during the round-table. Clearly those leading the components have extensive and globally-reaching networks through which they can communicate the findings. The extent to which this reach extends downwards at country level is unclear.</p>
<p>Reliable, usable evidence is produced.</p> <p>Data is synthesized clearly and disseminated effectively.</p>	<p>This assumes that all evidence generated will be of high quality and that the research processes are robust enough to produce quality outputs. Participants said that it should not be assumed that the programme would generate reliable and usable evidence (because of capacity issues) but agreed this is a key fundamental goal to which they are working.</p> <p>It is unclear to the evaluation team the extent to which this process of synthesis is expected to happen at component level, but also across the programme. <b>We would argue that in order for a critical mass of evidence on WW to emerge, programme wide aggregation of evidence is needed, and the necessary infrastructure and capacity established within the programme to enable this to happen.</b> Buy-in across all 3 components is essential in order for this to happen.</p>

<p>Better knowledge and evidence is key to mobilizing action, and designing and implementing effective programming.</p> <p>Findings are communicated effectively to enable them to be used in the design of new programmes.</p> <p>Development actors have interest in evidence and appetite and resources to use evidence in policy making and programme design.</p>	<p>Concerns were raised during the ToC workshop, and also in a number of KAIs, that this assumption should be questioned. Research evidence, in itself, is not enough to trigger change. Research can generate clear lessons on WW but for lessons to be put into action political will and a commitment of resources are needed.</p> <p>It is sometimes difficult to determine how best to interpret the accounts of different actors, especially because research uptake and policy influencing involves political and sometimes highly contested processes. Equally, policymakers may not accept claims that their decisions can be attributed to the influence of another actor.</p> <p>The means by which evidence is communicated is key to the promotion of effective and sustained research uptake (e.g. in both policy and practice). Dissemination (as in the current ToC) suggests a more passive approach than is likely to be necessary. As evidenced by the RU literature review (see Annex 11 for a list of documents and WW programme outputs reviewed) a proactive approach is needed which targets key actors identified through a systematic stakeholder analysis and in each context (Annex 4). One DFID KI also raised concern that knowledge products generated from the evidence must be accessible. An over-focus on the generation of peer-reviewed articles is unlikely to generate impact beyond the academy.</p> <p>It is difficult to judge the specific contribution of one initiative to a change, particularly as influencing and advocacy tends to be more effective when carried out in coalitions, alliances and networks.</p> <p>Outright success' in terms of achieving a specific, pre-planned change is mostly rare, with objectives modified or abandoned along the way. Plus, there is often an element of subjectivity around whether the policy gains are significant (or not), and the extent to which they have been co-opted.</p> <p>Referring to the RU section in this report and to the proposed evaluation approach: at each country level stakeholder analysis is critical to capture the extent to which policy makers represent effective vehicles for challenging harmful social norms. If they represent obstacles because they uphold these norms what room for transformation is there? Where might the entry points of influence be? These represent critical uptake questions which the evaluation will carry forward.</p> <p>Policy change tends to occur over longer timeframes, which may be less suitable to the project-orientated timescales of most aid agencies – particularly with the increasing pressure to demonstrate results over short time periods.</p>
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### Outcome and Impact Levels

Although there are agreed areas of improvement for the logframe, the consensus from key stakeholders was that further major change to the logframe was not desirable. However, a pragmatic solution to this could be the inclusion of new intermediate outcomes that map possible (and agreed) trajectories to change earlier in the believed project impact pathway.

Therefore, the following suggestions are made in the context of potential root and branch re-fashioning of the current (Business Case) ToC (Table 5).

Table 5: Critical Analysis of the ToC

ToC Change	Critical analysis emerging from the ToC round-table, KAIs and the team’s technical knowledge
<p>Robust knowledge and evidence made widely available to key actors, leading to the development of and investment in more effective VAWG policies and programmes across the global south.</p>	<p>The outcome level of the ToC needs further development to capture the assumed causal chain and to embed and interlink social norm change with policy.</p> <p>It is not clear how components will challenge social norms in relation to mind-sets. The overall focus seems to be on leveraging influence over stakeholders who can in turn sanction increased funding of VAWG prevention measures. WW literature reviews summarized in the Evaluation Inception Report present models (e.g. ecology approach) that link intervention to behaviour change. Mind-set change is of course the focus at local level and will be present in C1 and C2 in the goals of the interventions and innovations being funded. The links between the different layers of WW in terms of the goals would help to embed links between social norm change and prevention through greater policy and practice commitment and resourcing.</p> <p>For example, the following outcome statements could inform milestones:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Robust and enduring relationships among policy and practice/service delivery actors, based on joint development of policy and its translation into action that challenges VAWG normalisation.</li> <li>▪ Robust and enduring relationships between policy and practice actors and civil society.</li> </ul>
<p>New and improved policies and programmes leading to reduced prevalence of VAWG in ten DFID priority countries.</p>	<p>The impact level could include understanding of how evidence translates into practice. This would bridge the gap acknowledged by round-table participants between evidence of what works and uptake. Acknowledgingt of how long it takes to reach impact, would also help.</p> <p>The question of how to scale up again represents a programme gap highlighted by a number of the KIs.</p> <p>The evaluation team has explored how C1 - 3 understand ‘innovation’ and continue to assess how applicable these definitions may be across the global south. This has particular relevance for ‘scaling up’ of successful interventions (in a second phase and beyond). Innovation can be defined in many ways and it is likely that each component has applied it differently. Innovation at a top level needs to focus on filling gaps in knowledge and on how to leverage knowledge well.</p>

Analysis of the logframe

The WW Programme has one overarching aggregated logframe, which displays each component's indicators and activities in parallel. The logframe is founded on the impact statement that also grounds the DFID ToC:

*“Improved Policies and programmes reduce the prevalence of VAWG and increase the number of women and girls receiving high quality prevention and response services in at least 10 DFID priority countries.”*

Component informants talked (at the round-table and in interviews) about the difficulties in formulating this overarching logframe, in a way which would adequately capture the work of all three components. This remains a problem. It is best overcome by [each component setting its own milestones and targets within the overarching logframe](#). Revisions to the logframe presented take the need for more emphasis on innovation and capacity development into account. Revisions will take into account the fact that the impact statement is reachable only after two programme phases (see below).

In the original logframe, there are also embedded assumptions around *'scaling-up'*: it is assumed that the evidence gathered in [highly localised contexts](#) will have translatable relevance not only nationally but also globally. There is little global evidence to suggest this is the case<sup>13</sup>.

At this stage, we cannot change the logframe impact or outcomes but it is possible to change outputs and the indicators at output and income level. These are the places where we have made suggested revisions. It is then up to the components to set milestones and targets which are relevant and realistic to them, and which will allow the programme to meet its outcomes.

We present in [Annex 12](#), revisions to the logframe.


### [The proposed, overarching ToC](#)

The ToC proposal we present here (below) draws on the original DFID ToC but, it starts and ends nearer the levels put forward in the component ToCs. These are levels which properly locate WW within the wider issue of prevention of VAWG, and ending it. They also relate more closely to the overall DFID ToC for Tracking Violence against Women and Girls put forward in 2014<sup>14</sup>. This ToC also relates closely to the C3 ToC (which is the one developed by ActionAid).

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<sup>13</sup> Recent law and policy change round FGM/C in some countries (Nigeria, Tanzania, The Gambia [might](#) provide some evidence of the local affecting the national) but advances in these cases are more likely to be based on “moments of opportunity” stimulated by the global movement and by political “capture” of the issue.

<sup>14</sup> OPM and e-Pact, (2014) Violence Against Women and Girls, Mapping DFID Programmes, Figure 1.



**Assumptions and risks:**

- Capacity for innovative implementation and for accompanying research/evaluation can be built
- Good, transparent and accountable partnerships can be built between implementation and research organisations
- Synergies can be built across the programme to show the value of the complex programme architecture
- Reliable, high-quality evidence can be produced
- RU strategies identify target audiences and at all levels, stimulate demand and develop attractive dissemination products
- In the first project phase, enough evidence and understanding is produced to stimulate investment in a second phase – leading to medium-term change
- Research contributes to promotion of political will to address VAWG

**SCOT Analysis :**

- **Strengths:** partnership between key end-VAWG experienced organisations managing the programme; strong reputations; adaptations of existing implementation approaches
- **Challenges:** lack of strong coordination mandate in Secretariat; possibilities of lessons not being documented; potential difficulties in building implementation/research partnerships; lack of existing capacities
- **Opportunities:** Connectivity to global end-VAWG movements; commitment from DFID and UK Gov.
- **Threats:** VAWG is socially rooted, political countercurrents to prevention; groups opposing change; insufficient resources for RU

Left (Green) bar = Component 2  
Center (Blue) bar = Component 1  
Right (Pink) bar = Component 3



## 4.2. Explanation

### Problem

Globally, one in three women and girls experiences violence in her lifetime. The likelihood of violence extends across all social contexts and circumstances, yet is exacerbated by shock (such as displacement, famine) and instability; conflict; poverty, substance misuse etc.. VAWG is a violation of the rights of women and girls and harms their physical, psychological, emotional and spiritual well-being. Globally, there are lacks in political will to respond: VAWG is socially-rooted and there may be political counter-currents to prevention and groups opposed to change. The contribution of VAWG to community and state-level fragility, and its personal, social and economic costs, are not well understood.

### Root causes

The root causes of VAWG can be found in gender inequalities and inequities driven by social norms and beliefs about the low status of girls and women and what it means to be a woman. Because these norms are powered by patriarchy, they are also perpetuated by women who may not only be powerless to change the *status quo* but also, initially, unwilling to do so. Gendered power relations which disadvantage women, are supported by negative social views on masculinities, women's empowerment, prescribed gender roles and patriarchal norms which see the use of violence as acceptable and dominance over women as desirable.

### Drivers and barriers

There following are key barriers and drivers:

1. There are limited resources and capacities to generate evidence of what works to prevent VAWG. In many countries capacity is not sufficient to design and implement interventions on VAWG prevention, or to design and carry out the research/evaluation, which will allow the evidence base to be built.
2. There is limited understanding on prevention of VAWG and on the distinctions between prevention, protection and other response.
3. There is a lack of knowledge on the drivers of VAWG in conflict and other humanitarian situations. This includes a lack of research expertise and an overall lack of understanding of the sensitive issues around VAWG in highly complex, difficult and risk-heavy contexts.
4. The link between VAWG and the economic and social costs to families, communities and states is not understood or taken into consideration in the elaboration of regulatory, social protection or development systems.

## 4.3. Approaches

### Three distinct but inter-connected programme components

Through a programme architecture consisting of three distinct but inter-linked research components (implementation/research; research in conflict/humanitarian settings, the social and economic costs of VAWG), we will make a strong contribution to building global understanding on what it takes to prevent VAWG. Programme success is based on building synergies and cross-learning between the components, and producing a body of high-quality and well-targeted evidence which can be taken up across the full range of stakeholders: from civil society through to national governments, donors and international organisations.

### Innovation is key

There is a need for innovation in the design and implementation of projects, some of which may be based on adaptation of existing approaches to VAWG and to social protection and communication. Innovation is needed to promote partnership between implementation agencies and research and evaluation organisations, so that we can learn about the approaches and uncover what works where, when and how. Building understanding on VAWG in conflict/humanitarian settings, and developing understanding on the social and economic costs of VAWG are, themselves, innovative.

## 4.4. Strategies

### Capacity development is vital

The capacity of stakeholders to design, implement, research and evaluate interventions needs to be developed in stakeholders, at all levels, to produce high-quality evidence and disseminate this through appropriate RU strategies.

To use resources optimally, we need to build full understanding of the audiences for research, to define their relative importance in ending VAWG, and to present evidence in ways which are attractive to the different audiences. This means that each component needs to develop its RU strategy which fits within the overall strategy for the programme, as a whole.

In-depth mapping and identification of project and country-level champions and change-drivers will help in definition of target audiences and production of the right type of materials: online communications, policy briefs, blogs, peer-reviewed articles etc.

Monitoring and evaluation of all aspects of the programme are vital, so that lessons can be learned and shared. On-going M&E will also inform development of the programme second phase – which will be needed to reach tangible outcomes in terms of policy change (at higher levels) and reduction in VAWG. A programme-hosted ASM, will provide opportunities for learning and sharing across and between the programme, and influential decision-makers. This is important to ensure that all possibilities for leverage are used, to secure future buy-in.

### Immediate Change (by 2018)

By 2018, there will be innovation across the programme, in implementation and research/evaluation. This will have allowed greater understanding of what works where, when and how to prevent VAWG. We will have greater understanding of the combination of interventions which are needed, in different contexts, to optimise VAWG prevention.

- A body of robust knowledge and evidence will have been made available widely to key actors, at all levels.
- By 2018, we will see uptake of research at all levels. We will be able to show how evidence is influencing donors in their policies for the next 5 – 10 years and, in a number of countries, how it is shaping intervention and influencing policy debate.
- There will be an increased pool of VAWG researchers and activists in targeted countries affected by conflict and humanitarian emergencies.
- The social and economic costs of VAWG will be emerging and new information will be available to decision-makers.

### Medium-term Change

By 2020 +/-, we expect the links between all forms of VAWG (IPV, GBV, HTPs etc.) to be fully understood. The global community will know why and how all these forms of VAWG affect the personal, social and economic well-being of individuals, families, communities and states. There will be international understanding of the links between VAWG, and instability and fragility, at all levels.

### Impact – at the end of two programme phases (10 years)

- New and improved policies and programmes are leading to reduced prevalence of VAWG in 10 priority countries.

## 4.5. Vision

- Women and girls are safe to pursue their human rights and fundamental freedoms (two generations, 30 years)
- Development gains (e.g. meeting the SDGs) are made, as a key barrier to their success is eliminated (one generation, 15 years).

## 5 Mid-Term Review Findings

Section 5.1 provides an overview of key findings from the MTR. We follow this with a discussion on findings under each of the OECD categories of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability. The issue of equity runs through each of these categories and is discussed separately under effectiveness. At this stage of programme review, we have decided to include all four OECD categories, as they give us a baseline understanding of how WW is developing and its role in catalysing future action for VAWG prevention.

*“This 3-5 years is about building the momentum... After 3-5 years there will be a temptation to say ‘this is it!’. But what we need, is to get enough evidence to secure future buy-in. We mustn’t try for so much that it falls and fails”*

Gerard Howe, DFID

For the MTR, the evaluation team has decided that influence which stems from communication of project implementation experience (from all three components), and influence generated by research/evaluation, need to be accorded equal value. The nature of the research and evaluation in WW (much of it long-term and academic) means that few findings are ready for communication but much is already being learned about what to implement, and how to do so. There has also been significant learning and sharing about development of approaches and of how to combine implementation and research. In the findings that follow, we take examples, not only from research and evaluation evidence, but from learnings gained through implementation.

### 5.1. Overview of Key Findings

*What Works is an ambitious and exciting programme with bold architecture and modalities, and it uses innovative approaches.*

Globally, until WW, approaches to reducing and preventing VAWG have tended to be piecemeal and fractured. The three components of WW offer a unique opportunity to develop understanding on what is needed to [prevent](#) VAWG, [protect](#) women and girls and [promote](#) better response across policy and programming environments. Innovation is key, throughout the programme. This is not only in terms of the development of C1 projects but also in the focus of C2 on understanding VAWG in humanitarian and conflict situations, and of C3 in understanding the economic costs of failing to address VAWG. When these three components are successfully combined, there is a possibility for great synergy and potential to achieve desired and stated outcomes.

*Lessons are being learned that will be useful across the global community with high potential to shape donor investment over next 5-10 years.*

At mid-term, the indications are that learning being generated through WW, and to be generated throughout the rest of this programme phase, will set the framework for end-VAWG policy and programming over the next decade. Phase 1 of the programme focuses on Intimate Partner Violence (IPV). However, learning will reach across the VAWG environment to encompass wider aspects of Gender-Based Violence, including Harmful Traditional Practices (HTP). There will also be useful lessons to be learned in relation to wider programming issues, for example, the inter-connections between HIV transmission, GBV and livelihood security.

WW is stimulating development of a Community of Practice (CoP) between research and intervention. It is also beginning to catalyse a wider range of actors.

The programme has needed to focus on capacity development of partner organisations to a far greater extent than originally anticipated in programme design. In C1, the need to strengthen intervention and research/evaluation approaches, sometimes to the extent of bringing implementation and evaluation organisations together, has led to valuable opportunities to build a meaningful learning-platform in the Community of Practice. Organisations are learning from each other, and are sharing experiences between each other without, necessarily, going through programme management. Learning is being shared across continents and across a range of different approaches to preventing and ending VAWG. This is beginning to catalyse a wider range of actors.

*“On need basis, peer to peer learning and cross project sharing is strongly encouraged and supported. In our experience this works best when there is an actual issue to share around when projects can share experiences etc.” (Comments on the Evaluation Inception Report)*

Although it is early to see great evidence of research uptake at higher policy levels, there is evidence to show that research, and experience, are influencing individual organisations, and shaping their approaches and strategies in a way that positions the generation and use of evidence in a more central and meaningful way.

WW establishes DFID as a ‘brand’ leader in the end-VAWG and RU fields, with clear actions that can be taken to leverage this position.

Investment in WW is showing positive returns which will help to consolidate DFID’s (and the UK Government’s) leadership in the field of end-VAWG. DFID has an important role to play in helping to push for RU and to getting end-VAWG firmly onto the policy agenda. With its current, and developing, portfolio on adolescent girls and young women, their health and well-being, DFID is potentially well-placed to influence governments and other donors through a variety of international fora.

The WW programme has done well in progressing towards generating a programme wide body of work, despite the components being contracted separately

Despite having been commissioned by DFID as three separate programmes of work (with their own objectives, management and contractual arrangements, RU strategies and ways of working), the programme has developed a WW brand, and body of evidence, with the potential to leverage change at a higher level than components would have been able to achieve individually.

The programme would benefit from further development of the coordination and cross-learning between the three components.

The three components work well together, but the design of the programme, and current management mandates, mean that this is more because of their desire and willingness to work together than because it is a requirement. Budget adjustments have been made so that C1 has more money available for work which unites the three components and builds the synergies expected by DFID. Having a Senior RU Specialist answerable to all three components, and resourcing to work across the programme, together with and having a programme-wide RU ToC and strategy will help to reinforce the bonds between the components. Cross-learning might

also be further stimulated by including more cross-component activities in the Annual Scientific Meeting (ASM), and by the production of a series of “Working Papers”.

**The complexity and ambition of the programme presents many challenges.**

Programme partners often work in difficult and adversarial contexts, seeking to generate and promote evidence in contexts where there may be limited political will to address all aspects of VAWG and, particularly IPV. Building evidence, and getting it seen, discussed, influencing decision-makers at all levels and academic thinking, and informing programming and practice may be possible, with an explicit and strategic RU push. However, generating substantive impact to change policy at national levels, and to embed end-VAWG in a significant number of legal and regulatory structures, will take time beyond the current programme period. A second phase will be needed.

**RU management needs strengthening. Currently, work for RU is in its infancy, but it will need more support and resourcing to optimise possibilities and potentials.**

The recent appointment of the RU position in the Secretariat is helpful. But, capacities need to be stronger so as to really promote RU at all levels. In terms of RU, components are not yet strongly linked and, we do not feel there is yet a common RU drive or fully strategic approach. To begin to support the needed strengthening, we have included a brief “How To” note as [Annex 13](#).

## 5.2. An Overview of Programme Progress

As part of the “light-touch” approach of the MTR, we have conducted a swift review of progress towards programme outputs and outcome. Progress is good, and the programme appears to be on-track. We give recommendations for strengthening the approach in [Section 6](#). [Table 6](#) gives a brief, “traffic-lights” overview of progress. The table is given in more detail in [Annex 7](#).

Table 6: Traffic light overview of Progress

Logframe Level	Rating
Outcome	
Improved development of and investment in violence against women and girls evidence-based policies and programmes across the global south (including by UK Government, International agencies, development partners, and national governments)	WW continues to add value to DFID's bilateral programmes. Uptake from evidence-based programmes.
Output 1	
High quality and policy relevant evidence on what works to prevent violence against women and girls produced (C1)	29 outputs in total
Output 2	
Innovation programmes to prevent violence against women and girls are implemented and evaluated in the global south (C1)	10 innovation grants Awarded, with M&E plans.
Output 3	
Rigorous research and evidence on drivers, prevalence, trends, prevention and response in conflict and humanitarian emergencies produced (C2)	Total number of outputs 10; Cumulative no. of specific datasets on prevention interventions cleaned, archived & accessible- under discussion
Output 4	
Policy relevant research, evidence and methodological advances on the economic and social costs of VAWG in developing	6 research outputs. Nata Duvvury & David Walker (ODI) are developing

countries (C3)	<i>Costing the impacts of GBV to business: A practical tool</i>
Output 5	
Effective dissemination of findings, and engagement with key stakeholders which aims to promote use of evidence (all 3 components)	Cross-component research uptake and engagement strategy approved by DFID. 50 policy or stakeholder engagement meetings to promote use of evidence.
Output 6	
Effective capacity-building activities with (southern) partners, organisations, implementing partners, and individuals carried out to generate and communicate evidence (all 3 components)	All components have and implement capacity development strategies

To reflect the fundamental importance of research quality and RU to programme success and achievement of outcomes, we have reviewed progress on these to date, using the Adapted Research Excellence & Uptake Framework. [Table 7](#) below tracks progress by the mid-term.

Table 7: Research Quality & Uptake Anticipated Progress

Dimension	Anticipated Mid-term Progress	Progress to Date
Research / Evidence Significance	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Identification of a range of peer review outputs.</li> <li>▪ Deliberate inclusion and support of southern researchers.</li> <li>▪ A mix of authorship should be apparent on outputs to date.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ The volume of publication differs across components.</li> <li>▪ Differences in terms of the number of journals available to specific subjects must be recognised (there are arguable more journals in public health and medical sciences than in economics and political science).</li> <li>▪ Publications should always include those most directly involved in data collection and analysis.</li> </ul>
Evidence Reach	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Rational for journal selections clear with reach in mind.</li> <li>▪ High citation journals selected as well as national outputs.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Certain subject areas are more willing to publish on VAWG, this taken into account and applied clear publishing strategies are emerging but need to be developed further.</li> </ul>
Research / Evidence Rigour	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Flagship publications should be in the planning stages.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Evidence that publishers are being approached and proposals drafted for special editions and volumes.</li> <li>▪ Engagement of southern researchers in article writing,</li> <li>▪ Evidence of a strong peer support system to build writing capacity at all levels.</li> </ul>
Evidence Impact	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Clear understanding of the demand for the VAWG programme findings and where potential impacts upon policy or practice are either likely or necessary (i.e. to change deficient policy or fill knowledge gaps).</li> <li>▪ Understanding of how the research uptake plans are laying the groundwork for influencing policy or practice.</li> <li>▪ Understanding that there is no exact science to achieving impact upon policy and practice, and that sometimes change is unexpected. Therefore, plans to influence policy or practice should be put in place ahead of time with sufficient flexibility to respond to opportunities that arise.</li> </ul>	<p>Given the MTR stage of the evaluation, these are emerging results:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Identification of the demand for WW evidence is implicitly understood by those involved in delivery at various levels, but not yet made fully explicit.</li> <li>▪ RU plans developed and have potential, if internalised, resourced and deployed, to guide effective uptake</li> <li>▪ Evidence of communication findings to academics outside of WW</li> <li>▪ Deliberate targeting of discourse influences inside global bodies.</li> </ul>



Dimension	Anticipated Mid-term Progress	Progress to Date
RU Capacity	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Iterative approach is underway to monitoring, evaluating and adapting the programme's pathways to impact.</li> <li>▪ An understanding of what RU is and why it is important exists at each of the three levels: project, component and the programme as a whole.</li> <li>▪ A needs assessment has been conducted about where and consequently how RU capacity needs strengthening.</li> <li>▪ A designated budget and team member allocation for RU embedded within each component and the programme as a whole.</li> <li>▪ A clear awareness of the RU resources available to the components and the programme, such as, the DFID RU Guidance for funded projects.</li> <li>▪ An active, peer learning focused approach to capacity development. Which is itself constantly monitored, evaluated and iterated.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Needs assessment conducted and seems to have informed capacity strengthening plans. Evidence of learning lessons about CoP and using feedback to improve CB approaches (in C1)</li> <li>▪ Resources for CB of RU seems limited for C1 and not available for C2 and C3</li> <li>▪ Late Effective coordination of CB of C1 projects by Secretariat and SDD</li> </ul>
RU Strategy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ A well designed, feasible and flexible research uptake strategy is in place and is being monitored, evaluated and iterated by designated staff at programme and component levels.</li> <li>▪ There is awareness of the overarching RU strategy within the components and projects and an implicit 'nesting' of ambitions so that projects feed into components and into overall programme, and feed into overall WW goals and ToC.</li> <li>▪ The appropriate resources have been attached to the activities outlined in the RU strategy.</li> <li>▪ A clear understanding is present at all levels RU does not just happen after the research findings are produced but should be planning for from the outset.</li> <li>▪ Processes are facilitated to optimise reflection, lesson learning and course correction</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ RU strategies in place for all 3 levels: unclear the extent to which RU plans of projects/components/programme 'fit' together and are mutually reinforcing and owned</li> <li>▪ Late approvals of project-level RU plans may have delayed extent to which RU plans or strategies and stakeholder mapping in place for all 3 levels: these are of differing quality, some excellent. They do not apply consistent tools of analysis which makes programme-wide assessments challenging.</li> <li>▪ Early loss of RU senior staff and belated recruitment of RU Manager delayed approval and enactment of project-level RU plans – need to make up time from MTR</li> <li>▪ Lack of clarity on resources available/dedicated to this strategic area at all levels because of contractual arrangements and lack of monitoring data made available</li> <li>▪ Processes to optimise reflection, lesson learning and</li> </ul>

Dimension	Anticipated Mid-term Progress	Progress to Date
		course correction around RU is basic within components but not yet visible across programme
Engagement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Stakeholder mapping has been carried out.</li> <li>▪ A well designed, flexible and feasible stakeholder engagement plan has been designed and is being monitoring, evaluated and iterated.</li> <li>▪ The necessary resources have been designated to the engagement plan and responsibilities have been attached to actions.</li> <li>▪ Key stakeholders have been identified within the mapping and appropriate, feasible and flexible plans have been attached according to importance and windows of opportunity.</li> <li>▪ Relationships across different components and key stakeholders have been established or the first contact planned.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Stakeholder mapping conducted at all 3 levels – some excellent and well-informed</li> <li>▪ Different tools of analysis used to analyse which makes programme-wide assessments challenging.</li> <li>▪ Active engagement at multiple levels - unsure to what extent these map onto initial analysis. No evidence of ‘joined up’ engagement plans across programme to enable a more strategic deployment of WW personnel</li> <li>▪ Excellent reputation in the sector likely to open doors and be leveraged effectively for uptake</li> </ul>
Strategic Communication	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Communications are based on quality evidence, rigorous synthesis, innovative packaging and two-way communication over dissemination.</li> <li>▪ Communication materials have been designed with the target audiences in mind (as identified by the stakeholder mapping carried out as part of RU plans)</li> <li>▪ Use of both digital and traditional communications outputs<sup>15</sup>.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Strong programme-wide website, actively populated which reflects diversity of projects and interventions – some in more detail than others</li> <li>▪ Social media platforms established and managed effectively, but not yet participatively, by all WW actors.</li> <li>▪ Few public documents produced reflecting early stages in research: what there is on show is professionally produced</li> <li>▪ Guidance in place to ensure communications products are high standard – unsure how much support has been extended to C2 and C3 because of capacity issues</li> </ul>

<sup>15</sup> Including a range of the following: 1) website 2) social media 3) newsletter 4) policy briefs 5) evidence briefs 6) research papers 7) lay summaries or executive summaries 8) blogs 9) conference presentations 10) stakeholder meetings 11) advising policy makers 12) meetings with practitioners across topics 13) videos 14) podcasts 15) infographics 16) press releases 17) op eds

## 5.3. Relevance

In the following section we provide emerging findings related to the relevance of the WW programme. Our findings are guided by the agreed relevance related evaluation questions in [Box 2](#) below.

### Box 2: Relevance Related Evaluation Questions

1. Is the evidence generated by the programme relevant to the target audience? Is it appropriate to needs, and attractive to potential users?
  - What evidence is there that the (programme-wide) Research Uptake strategy is a relevant and appropriate instrument which will facilitate uptake of research into policy?
  - What evidence is there for the on-going demand for the research being undertaken?
2. What evidence is there that the research undertaken by WW will have relevance to policy and practice in developing countries?

### Early indications that evidence generated is relevant to users (Q1)

Interviews with implementers, component leads and researchers, as well as with key stakeholders outside of the programme, show that the data and evidence that are being generated, and will be generated throughout the programme, are appropriate and in demand. As part of our political economy analysis we have interviewed, and will continue to interview, stakeholders outside the programme to gauge their knowledge and engagement with WW. Although on-going, stakeholders (for example, in Pakistan), have expressed their support and eagerness to receive the findings. However, caution has been expressed as to how the findings are communicated because of context (see [Annex 8](#) and [Box 10](#)).

There is a wide range of potential users (see tables on Research Uptake): from community-level organisations, women's organisations, local and national governments through to international donors and development organisations and women's movements.

MTR interviews with those involved in the Dadaab research have shown examples of the research already feeding back into improved case management practices. These include, for example, a more robust follow up procedure with survivors and closer concern around how to support the refugee case workers in their very important, yet high risk, work. Factors of success may be picked up by the cohort and staged nature of the research. Later data collection may evidence the improvements of more intervention, but this has yet to be published. C2 need to push to see if they can evidence improvement as a result of changed practice.

There is appetite amongst funding agencies (specifically DFID) and INGOs (for example, Population Council) for evidence that task-sharing might offer a VFM approach to delivering results in similar conflict settings, both in Kenya and the region more broadly.

A number of C1 projects have shared experiences and learning and this adds to the CoP based on WW innovation and research. There is good evidence to suggest that the experience of being part of the programme is relevant not only to each organisation generating the evidence, but to other organisations also involved in C1 innovation and evaluation/research. For example, learning and evidence gained by R2P in Hyderabad, Pakistan is already influencing design and

implementation of their other programmes in Pakistan, and is set to influence the organisation more widely<sup>16</sup>. This and other examples are discussed further in [Section 5.4](#), Effectiveness, and [Section 5.6](#), Sustainability.

### Relevance to Policy and Practice Development (Q2)

Globally, until WW, approaches to VAWG have tended to be piecemeal and fractured. The WW programme represents a significant, heavy investment in addressing particular aspects of the well-being and health of girls and women. It is intended and likely that results from the programme, and the evidence it generates, will have great influence on shaping investment for women and girls of the coming decade.

There is already strong evidence to show that the programme is generating evidence relevant to practice across the VAWG agenda, and to development of policy and strategy at all levels: for example, the processes through which the Secretariat supports the development of partnerships between implementation and evaluation organisations, helping them to refine ways of working together, developing capacity etc.. To date, this influence has largely been with stakeholders already involved in the programme, or close to it (implementation agencies and research / evaluation organisations and their peers). As more evidence is generated and shared, through a wide range of products and communication means, the influence of the programme is set to spread to a wider audience of decision-makers and practitioners. This is discussed in [RU Section 5.8](#), where we look at the need for better understanding of audiences, and careful targeting.

Each component has a different focus. C3 is not yet in a position to influence practice and policy directly, but as it develops evidence, it will open up new policy debates, and new programming directions, on the effect of VAWG. This change discourse aims to support the kind of practice and policy changes targeted by C1 and C3.

To ensure the greatest relevance of WW to future development of policy and practice, there needs to be even greater synergy between the three programme components than that which exists presently.

### Research demand (Q2)

Efforts are needed to generate appetite for evidence, amongst all potential audiences. It is highly likely that, when people know about the work, good-quality evidence will be taken up by a range of stakeholders, at all levels. Evidence of this can already be seen at the project level. For example, in Pakistan, despite the challenging environment, the R2P curriculum is being used by a number of government schools, beyond the immediate WW target schools in Hyderabad, Sindh.

### Strategic Engagement (Q2)

There is recognition in most of the RU strategies, that national governments and national-level influence is critically important, alongside ambitions at the global level. A key challenge is to take learning from projects and draw out statements which resonate and are felt to be relevant, at a global level.<sup>17</sup> This is a challenge that has not yet been explicitly addressed.

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<sup>16</sup> Pers. communication. Component 1, during MTR fieldwork in South Africa

<sup>17</sup> Notes from ASM, September 2016

There is less detailed analysis at this early stage, of the 'piggy-backing' that can be done onto other sector-based and thematic debates. These include, for example, using the relationship with the SVRI more effectively for disseminating information. SVRI has 4500 members and sends out weekly updates, has the bi-annual Forum, and has huge reach in the VAWG sector.<sup>18</sup> Stakeholder analysis and horizon scanning for events and policy debates that could be targeted with the emerging WW evidence will become increasingly important in the second half of the programme life.

#### Brokerage: using DFID and partner organisations (Q2)

There are more than 50 organisations involved in the direct delivery, or providing technical and advisory support to the programme. Together, they represent many different stakeholder groups, from development and humanitarian sectors, at local, national, regional and global levels. The potential of this group to identify and articulate the 'demand side' of evidence use, i.e. what solutions/answers people are looking for and what knowledge gaps are impeding their good decisions, is large. This potential can be actively used by, for example, asking DFID country offices and IAB / TAG members [what they need to know](#). The convening power of these organisations can be used to showcase WW at a country level.

One specific opportunity suggested by programme staff, is for DFID to advocate for the next big global summit to be focused on IPV, as previous summits have been on FGM/C, sexual violence in conflict and child marriage.<sup>19</sup>

### 5.4. Effectiveness

In the following section we provide emerging findings related to the effectiveness / potential impact of the WW programme. Our findings are guided by the agreed effectiveness-related evaluation questions in [Box 3](#) below. Findings are not exhaustive. The programme has produced a vast amount of work so far and, as noted above, is showing progress in all its outputs and towards its outcome. The assessment given here is indicative of that progress, but does not represent the fullness of achievements nor does it fully explore the challenges facing the programme.

#### Box 3: Effectiveness Related Evaluation Questions

3. To what extent is WW contributing to prevention of VAWG? Is the learning generated, by WW, of practical applicability?
4. How effectively is the What Works programme implementing research uptake strategies so as to catalyse change in VAWG policy and practice?
  - To what extent is the evidence being generated by WW on track to influence policy change and investment levels in WW countries and beyond?
  - To what extent are results in specific thematic areas (e.g. costs of scale up; approaches to social norms change; preventing violence against children) likely to increase influence and lead to changes in policies and practice around preventing and ending VAWG
  - What evidence is there that the (programme-wide) Research Uptake strategy is a

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<sup>18</sup> Recommendation from IAB at Dubai ASM, September 2016

<sup>19</sup> IAB Dubai September 2016

relevant and appropriate instrument to optimise communication and support RU into policy? Does the strategy allow an adequate response to capacity needs in using research evidence for decision-making?

- To what extent are the M&E data collection and sense-making processes fit for purpose for tracking on-going changes and improving research uptake?
5. How is WW contributing to VAWG-related knowledge and research capacity/skills of programme implementers and evaluators?
  6. How is WW contributing to understanding, research methods and theory, and to the use of these for VAWG prevention?
  7. With whom, and how, is the programme raising the visibility and importance of using evidence around what works to end VAWG?
  8. Are the modalities used an appropriate way in which to fund, and test out rigorously, new approaches to preventing VAWG?
  9. How effective is WW in reaching all different groups in societies, including the poorest and most vulnerable, those people living with different abilities, people identifying with different genders etc.

As in any other multi-component higher-budget programme there have been barriers to effectiveness in the first years of operation. However, the programme has done well to overcome these difficulties, and to mitigate the majority of risks. At mid-term we consider the programme to be functioning and on track to optimise effectiveness over the next years.

### Practical application of evidence (Q3)

The practical application of the evidence generated will be fully explored in the final evaluation. As suggested above, it is too early for research evidence to be applied. However, there is ample evidence, particularly in the projects supported by C1, of cross-learning and application of experience by different projects. For example, the implementation experience, and evidence already gathered by AKU in Pakistan, demonstrates mind-set change in boys and girls engaged in the R2P programme. Project staff believe that this can lead to a reduction in VAWG: through the adoption of positive masculinity in the boys as they grow and greater resilience in girls who will challenge violence now and in adulthood.<sup>20</sup>

### Is the programme on track? (Q4)

As the traffic-lights review in [Section 5.2](#) showed, the programme is on track to meeting its outputs and expected outcomes. WW has done well to overcome early obstacles (for example, working with a phased introduction of the different components and inevitable difficulties in ensuring that all chosen partner organisations could operate to required standards). For example, 16 out of 17 C1 projects are functioning well. It is too early to make a fully meaningful assessment of the effect of the programme. However, recent development of strategic approaches and increased synergy between the components suggest that the foundations for fully effective working are in place. The programme needs to ensure that it is capturing all necessary aspects of interventions in qualitative and quantitative M&E. The IE team have offered to share some simple methods for organisation of qualitative M&E data, with the

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<sup>20</sup> The ability of girls to “say no” to violence having developed self-esteem and confidence, is evidenced in other programmes outside WW, for example, the 12+ programme in Rwanda.

Secretariat, to complement and strengthen their current methods (collection on “Wow” stories: examples of successes).

### Ethics and rigour (Q5)

Each component follows its own, rigorous, ethical processes. C1 draws on the ethical review procedures of the MRC as well as in-country partner institutions. Similarly, in C2, the IRC will comply with the procedures of the LSHTM and in country the research design has been reviewed by the ethics board of the APHRC. C3 also follows the processes of its partners as well as reviews conducted by the lead institution.

All research is closely supervised with data collection halted if it is deemed unethical. For example, C3 stopped data collection in Pakistan when the results being gained seemed invalid set against the DHS, retraining was undertaken before the work resumed. In South Sudan C3 is considering pulling back from qualitative research for ethical reasons due to the desperate situation there.

Ethical issues are most pressing in conflict/humanitarian settings. In Dadaab, methodological challenges have been dealt with in ways that prioritise ethics and rigour, and we anticipate that the research ultimately generated will be stronger as a consequence. Ensuring methodological rigour may have delayed the research but these delays are well-justified. For example, qualitative methods had to be halted when researchers were found to be inadequate (re-traumatisation was being caused during interviews). However, new researchers were recruited and trained through the APHRC (with support from the LSHTM and IRC), and improved data collection methods were introduced.

The ethical review process at some lead institutions seems very lengthy (the MRC for example will usually require two months to complete a review). This may well have implications for data collection. It could also lead to tensions between researchers at different institutions who may feel it to be an unnecessarily lengthy process. Rigorous ethical review is necessary, but greater openness about the need for certain timescales may help to reduce concerns.

### Capacity Development for implementation of projects and research/evaluation (Q5)

Capacity development is one of the most dynamic and productive aspects of WW implementation. However, it is one which received little/no recognition in original programme design or budgeting, or in the DFID results framework. At design stage, it was assumed that, whilst implementing agencies (grantees) might need technical support, research/evaluation organisations would not. Experience of the programme so far, has shown that there is a need for capacity strengthening and development throughout the programme. This is not only around building implementation and research/evaluation approaches but also in how these approaches can be combined, and how good working relationships between very different types of organisations can be fostered and facilitated. The Secretariat has provided capacity development technical assistance (TA) for C1 projects. The country-level TAGs have also been important in this.

*‘Whilst the focus of the last year has been on data collection, the systems and processes the Consortium has established for research uptake have already started to pay off. The engagement of the country level and study level TAGs has ensured that Component 2 is connected to key*

*conversations and contacts across a range of relevant disciplines and fields.* (C2, 2017 Annual Report)

Table 8 below highlights a selection of capacity development activities since January 2015.

Table 8: Selected capacity development events since January 2015

Date	Activity, event, staff change
January 2015	Annual Capacity Development workshops: all project grantees were brought together 'clinic style'. Project staff & intervention specialists, 5 days of intense 1-on-1 support.
January 2015	SDDirect TAs contracted.
June 2015	Samantha Willan started in Capacity Development position.
September 2015	Inaugural Annual Scientific Meeting in September 2015.
November 2015	WW Communities of Practice series was launched.
February 2016	WW monitoring framework and guidance provided to IGs to develop their own M&E plans by SDDirect and the WW Secretariat.
30th March - 1st April 2016	Capacity building workshop held in South Sudan by GWU.
Feb. - July 2016	Research Uptake and Stakeholder Engagement Strategy finalised in February and signed off by DFID in late July 2016.
August 2016	WW Component One, Grantee Satisfaction Survey.
September 2016	WW to Prevent Violence Against Women & Girls Joint Research Uptake and Engagement Operational Plan.
September 2016	WW Annual Scientific Meeting in Dubai. Including an IAB meeting and two days of capacity building sessions.
November 2016	WW C1: Monitoring capacity development over time.

#### Box 4: Capacity building defined

Capacity Building is defined as enhancing the abilities of individuals, organisations and systems. There are three levels of capacity building as outlined in the How to note, and these are framed in the context of the What Works for Violence Prevention project as follows:

- **Individual:** building capacity of researchers to design and undertake research, write up and publish research findings, influence policy makers, etc. The individual level also involves building capacity of VAWG practitioners to design and undertake evidence- and theory-based prevention interventions, apply research to programming and policy advocacy, etc.
- **Organisational:** developing the capacity of research departments and institutes, NGOs working on VAWG, think tanks and allied organisations, to fund, manage and sustain themselves to continue to effectively serve the violence prevention field.
- **Institutional:** work at this level involves influencing the incentive structures, the political and the regulatory context and the resource base for research and prevention programming for ending VAWG. It also involves increasing the value of rigorous research and evaluation evidence in policy- and decision- making processes.

*Source: What works to prevent violence against women and girls? Capacity Building Strategy*

To ensure that the WW programme can function, the Secretariat has needed to invest much more heavily than expected in capacity development. Capacity development was an important component in the original log-frame and budget, but aspects of capacity (for example, the ability to design WW projects and evaluation approaches) were presumed, in design, to pre-exist amongst potential partners. This has not always been the case.



It is vital that the work that has gone into capacity development is now fully recognised, as it has been fundamental for learning and for research uptake, and in building the early possibilities for success of the programme (in being able to work towards its innovation and RU outcomes).

The Secretariat has taken a strategic approach towards building the capacity of its grantees in C1. Skills gaps have been identified and an on-going programme of interventions established to support implementation and research organisations, as needed. See [Box 5](#) as an example.

#### Box 5: Capacity building and support

In [Tajikistan](#) struggled throughout 2015 trying to develop a social norms change and economic empowerment approach. In 2016, there was a change in TA both at the operational level (CESVI and International Alert). TA from the Secretariat was also intensified when it was seen that the project needed capacity development both on intervention approach and research. The head of the Secretariat and another staff member went to Tajikistan and introduced the project to an adaptation of Stepping Stones. This has greatly helped to shape the work of the project.

In [Bangladesh](#), HERespect were trying to develop and augment an existing health project. With capacity development support from the Secretariat, they are now using a model approach based on adaptation of Stepping Stones, and working with ICDDR-Bangladesh as the research organisation.

In some instances, it has been possible to promote cross-country learning alongside capacity development: Tajikistan has been teamed with VSO Nepal (One Community One Family project) so that they can learn from each other and, in March 2017, a capacity development programme on quantitative research, in Tajikistan, will also involve representatives from Afghanistan and Nepal.

*Source: MTR field visit to Secretariat*

Inputs for capacity development for implementation and research fit well with development of RU capacity ([Section 5.8](#)). The example in [Box 6](#), from C2, illustrates how capacity development, through practice, requires skilful management but can build capacity which researchers can use in future work and other programmes:

#### Box 6: Training Researchers in Dadaab

In the [Dadaab](#) project training researchers to collect data on VAWG for the first time was clearly challenging. Interviews with researchers involved in data collection highlighted how much the training was appreciated and its impact in terms of capacity development. One researcher stated “I knew nothing about VAWG before starting this project and now I know lots. I also understand how to approach researching on what is a complex and highly sensitive topic.” Coordinating research of this nature is difficult and the management structures are clearly robust enough to support it. The research management involves ensuring that there are opportunities for all involved to share their views and experiences of the research but also the project. One actor commented; *“these sessions are vital for us to share examples of good practice or to identify areas that we can improve immediately.”*

In the [Stepping Stones Creating Futures](#) evaluation, one researcher commented: *“One of the best things about facilitating research is that you think that the people you research with will be different but they are still human”*

*Source: MTR Case Studies*

### Research Uptake strategies: fit to purpose (Q5)

The development of a programme-wide RU ToC (March 2017) is a good start to achieving a programme-wide vision of how to make sense of the evidence emerging and deploy the capacity and positioning of WW actors at all levels to engage strategically and purposefully in the different contexts to achieve programme-wide influencing ambitions. However, the programme and DFID now need to ensure that the RU ToC is understood, and owned, by all actors.

There is differential understanding of RU and commitment to uptake across the programme portfolio and much more could be done to share these approaches, and to build on the strengths that exist in the organisations with stronger capacity and experience. Understanding of the RU audience, and of the relative effect of “targeting” different audiences in different ways, is not yet deep enough. We are not sure that there will be enough budget to make full use of knowledge and understanding and to put all aspects of RU strategy into operation (and to monitor and evaluate).

There is little explicit consideration of the ‘demand side’ for the potential findings at any of the three levels (project, component and programme). Because of the deep experience of many of the WW actors in the VAWG sector, and the embeddedness of many of the actors working at country level in the projects, we believe that understanding of demand exists [implicitly](#)<sup>21</sup>. The time is now right to make this implicit understanding explicit, and to be fully strategic in deploying RU budgets.

### Challenges to evidence uptake in humanitarian settings (Q5)

The way evidence is used by those doing humanitarian programming is experiential, informed by an ever-changing context as it unfolds in the most difficult circumstances (for example, Dadaab, Typhoon Haiyan). People working in humanitarian settings – which are always the most remote and inaccessible difficult to reach - are the frontline humanitarians and may not necessarily have skills and resources to access or use the evidence that they need to do their jobs optimally<sup>22</sup>.

Those providing humanitarian services are constrained by the protocols and processes and the way they’re meant to do things versus being able to respond flexibility and appropriately to the situation that exists on the ground. This limits the ‘transformational’ potential of the work e.g. in protection of civilian sites is so limited because of the rigid protocols e.g. protecting confidentiality<sup>23</sup>. Some of the reasons why the humanitarian sector does not systematically draw on evidence are practical:

- humanitarian actors don’t use data because they don’t have time to access, interpret, and put it to work;
- they don’t always have experience/expertise to use it; and
- they lack the political imperative to apply it in their work.

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<sup>21</sup> From KAIs for the MTR and publication record of programme staff.

<sup>22</sup> This is a common debate between development and humanitarian actors. See, for example, Report of the UNICEF Global Gender Network Meeting, June 2016, UNICEF, NY.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

In some instances, they have stopped trying because they know from experience that it's not going to go anywhere<sup>24</sup>.

'Adaptive programming' and other currently-favoured practices provide a good opportunity to focus on monitoring, reflecting on programme implementation, 'sense-making' in real time, and then using the learning to course correct and improve. This is an opportunity to communicate and use evidence to make better and smarter and more efficient decisions<sup>25</sup>.

### Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning, for RU (Q5)

There are no universal indicators for RU being used beyond the logframe ones, which are very high level and not likely to reveal much in the early stages of the programme. However, the recent development of the RU ToC may lead to new indicators, although this RU ToC needs **ownership** across all components. We did not find evidence of any facilitated discussion across the programme on how RU measurement can be made consistent and improved, to help the components both learn as they go, and 'aggregate up' and draw conclusions at programme-wide levels on RU.

### The effect of research on project implementation (Q6)

There are both advantages and inherent risks in accompanying implementation with rigorous and structured research. Implementers are keen to either get on with "*business as usual*" or to put new approaches and skills into operation. Researchers are constrained by budget and timelines as to what, and how they can research and evaluate, and they need the project to operate in a way that will make research possible. The focus in WW is to build a body of evidence which will convince decision-makers (at all levels), and this puts a strong focus on quantitative data sets: an approach which is generally unfamiliar to civil society organisations working at local levels (which are themselves, are often ill-suited to carrying out quantitative surveys but well-suited to qualitative study and enquiry). Given the potential for misunderstanding and mismatch between implementation and research, the programme appears to be making positive progress (Box 7).

#### Box 7: Implementation & Research

**In Dadaab** – project documentation and interviews with Dadaab researchers and the PI's at both institutions clearly highlighted how rigorous the process, both of project design and data collection, had been. The datasets are large and the approach mixed, which should maximise the body of evidence produced and lead to a much deeper contextual understanding.

**In Pakistan**, researchers are doing a baseline assessment with 40 schools (20 boys', 20 girls' – 10 control and 10 intervention for each) – children of 6th to 8th grade. When stakeholders were asked how they felt about the research approach some concerns were raised that it was heavily quantitative, which risked certain aspects of their work not being captured. For example, one actor interviewed stated 'it does not capture the soul of it.' Concern that the ways in which girls' are being empowered will not be documented, were raised as the RCT will focus on evidence that attitudes have changed rather than explore 'how they have'. One of the researchers interviewed explained the approach saying that a RCT design was being used in order to understand whether R2P is effective in addressing: "bullying, violence amongst children and

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<sup>24</sup> KAI MTR Field Visit.

<sup>25</sup> KAI MTR Field Visit.

increasing their self-reliance or not.”

In South Africa, both Project Empower and Sonke acknowledged that there have been constraints to their work because of needing to “fit” with the demands of research. For project Empower, this has been most noticeable in the fact that they cannot recruit/allow in new participants to the Stepping Stones process when original participants (registered for the research) drop out. They also noted the difficulty of having identified a control group, but knowing that many of this group are likely to have moved on or away before they can be incorporated into the programme after the completion of the research. Sonke, too, drew attention to the fact that the research has meant they have needed to draw up geographical cluster boundaries which are suitable for the research, but make little sense in real terms. Both Sonke and Witwatersrand University said that it would have been better to carry out research with women as well as men (since Sonke works with both sexes), but that budgets did not allow for this.

*Source: Field visits and KAIs for the MTR*

### Relationships between implementation and research organisations (Q6)

During the inception period for the Independent Evaluation, the evaluation team heard that tensions exist between the C1 implementing agencies and their accompanying research /evaluation organisations. Talks for the MTR with the Secretariat, suggest that even if some difficulties existed between with some partners, some of these have been acknowledged and addressed, some may continue to exist, and should be acknowledged and mitigated. However, the relationship between implementing agencies and research organisation is not always “natural”. The C1-based Secretariat, through its Capacity Development initiatives, has invested heavily in strengthening the implementation/ research partnerships across its grantees. The potential benefits of doing so, on individual capacities, ways of working, organisational norms and values around using evidence are large.

The ability to promote good working relationships between implementing agencies and research/ evaluation organisations is seen by the Secretariat as fundamental in setting the working framework for C1<sup>26</sup>. The Secretariat has needed to invest more time and resources than expected in ensuring that the two different types of organisation a) understand and can fulfil their mandates under the programme and b) can work well together.

The original component design envisaged all grantee proposals to be a partnership between an implementation agency and a research organisation. This worked more smoothly in some cases than in others (Box 8).

#### Box 8: The importance of relationships

In Durban, South Africa, there is a long and intricate relationship between Project Empower (which is implementing Stepping Stones, Creating Futures --SSCF) and HEARD (which is the research organisation within the University of Kwa-Zulu Natqal), and the MRC. The strength of the relationship has meant that the working partnership between Project Empower and HEARD is built on a basis of trust. This has helped, both in terms of implementation of the SSCF approach in a way that is suitable for the Randomised Controlled Trial being carried out by

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<sup>26</sup> Pers. comm. Visit to the Secretariat for the MTR


HEARD, and in the fact that HEARD staff have a deep understanding, both of Stepping Stones and of the WW programme, as a whole. In Diepsloot, there is a similarly close relationship between Sonke (the implementing agency of the One Man Can project) and the University of Witwatersrand (which is implementing the Cluster Control trial and a piece of long-term ethnographic research). The Sonke trial has placed fewer operational constraints on Sonke's usual approach to implementation than those placed on Project Empower, but the strength of the relationship between Sonke and Witwatersrand is undoubtedly instrumental in minimising constraints to the project.

*Source: Visits to Project Empower and Sonke, MTR fieldwork, February 2017*

### Strategic engagement with stakeholders (Q7)

The programme, components and constituent projects have all undertaken and produced stakeholder mapping to varying degrees within their RU strategies. Although a WW, C2 and C3 RU strategy exists, C1 does not have a component specific RU strategy. We organised the stakeholder maps into a master database and analysed to identify the geographic scope of the stakeholder mapping and the prevalence of specific stakeholder groupings (such as research organisations, NGOs or policy makers). Overall, 615 organisations were identified as stakeholders in the mapping exercises carried out by the programme, components, and projects<sup>27</sup>. Problematically, only 232 of the 615 stakeholders included a named person or department attached to the organisation, i.e. only 38% of stakeholders were deemed specific enough or realistic to engage with by the evaluation team. 166 or 27% of stakeholders identified were donors, making up the largest stakeholder grouping. The second largest grouping was policy makers with 123 identified (20%), closely followed by NGOs with 115 identified (19%). The organisation most often identified was the UN (counted 51 times), followed by DFID (counted 20 times).

Figure 3: WW Stakeholder Analysis by Importance



Geographically, the largest category of stakeholders identified were those working across multiple countries, comprising 175 stakeholders (28%). The largest geographic grouping of stakeholders identified in one country was in Pakistan (59 stakeholders), likely due to the depth of the mapping by the projects based there. Other prominent geographic groupings in countries identified were: South Sudan, Kenya, Ghana, the UK and the USA (in that order).

Some stakeholder mapping exercises attached importance-levels to the stakeholders, using either the AIIM methodology or a self-devised scale. These importance indicators were consolidated into a singular scale, showing that 32% of stakeholders were of high importance whilst only 1% of stakeholders identified were of low importance. There was generally very little effort undertaken to map stakeholders of low importance. 40% of the stakeholders

<sup>27</sup> Note this includes duplicates. For example the UN, DFID and SVRI which were identified multiple times by different projects and were not removed during original analysis of the data.

identified were not given an importance rating, meaning that the stakeholder mapping process was partial or incomplete.

Stakeholder engagement was categorised broadly into four subsets of activity: conference, meeting, policy brief and other. Activities tallied against named stakeholders were analysed per component, project and at the programme level<sup>28</sup>. Of the 615 stakeholders identified only 88 were targeted with a specific activity, representing a 14% conversion rate of stakeholder engagement based on the original stakeholder mapping exercises. This percentage is low considering that the components have significantly overlapping stakeholders (with 66 organisations identified multiple times by different components or projects, making up 11% of stakeholders identified). However, the low conversion rate could also indicate that the original stakeholder mapping exercises were too broad and not realistic enough to allow for meaningful stakeholder engagement.

Conversion of stakeholder engagement demonstrated by concrete activities as relayed in the annual reports was entirely lacking for two stakeholder groupings: other development programmes and the private sector. It was highest in donors (22% conversion) and research organisations (15%).

#### Strategic communications (Q7)

Individuals are very well-positioned and strategic in the way they think about the opportunities for influencing the end-VAWG agenda (for example, the Dubai management meeting around using SVRI). Strategically the timing is now right for a focus on research uptake: the inclusion of violence in the SDGs means that prevention is now officially on the agenda. We cannot wait for final results before disseminating findings from the WW programme. It would be very valuable to locate the discussion of VAWG within wider discussion and commitments on gender equality and poverty reduction.

To optimise uptake, there needs to be understanding and ownership of RU ambitions of the programme as a whole at all levels i.e. project, component, programme and sequentially i.e. from the beginning of the research cycle. This is challenging.

The IAB noted at Dubai that some of the programme implementers seem to be unfamiliar with the research component and recommended that capacity building include a) helping implementers understand, and know how to talk about, the research and b) to build skills to fundraise for continuing the intervention after the research is done.

#### Programme design and governance (Q8)

The emphasis on learning and reporting outcomes, and (potentially impact) across the whole programme, has been challenging because the components were commissioned separately and report separately to DFID. This means that strategies for learning across components, and sense-making as an overarching programme, have not yet been fully developed

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<sup>28</sup> Information taken from the 2015, 2016, 2017 Annual Reports. The most complete source of information upon which to judge stakeholder engagement would have been the impact diary but this was not made available to the evaluation team.

Some of the biggest difficulties are in synchronising measurement instruments: when C2 and C3 were developing their studies and measurement instruments, they were not communicating with each other about them - so comparability of findings were possibly compromised. Expectations, about common development of instruments and comparable measurement across the components, could have been spelt out better in the Business Case and in the original ToRs for tender. Difference in start times, too, meant that C1 would, inevitably, develop its own measurement instruments<sup>29</sup>.

### The Independent Advisory Board (Q8)

The SA MRC acts as the Secretariat for the Management Committee and Independent Advisory Board (IAB). The IAB currently includes members of the WHO, UN Women, UNICEF, the World Bank, CEDOVIP, Know Violence in Childhood, ACIPH and the Nepalese Government Supreme Court, who meet as required to guide the WW programme. DFID see the IAB as important but even from within the IAB there are calls to improve its effectiveness. In the September 2016 IAB Committee meeting, the IAB asked both DFID and the MC *'to reflect on how to use the IAB more strategically'*. Some opportunities have been created, for example, the IAB creating links with UN Women, and C1 and 2 working with DFID and WHO to deliver a high-level expert roundtable on Data and Evidence at the Global Summit to End Sexual Violence in Conflict (June 2014). While the first IAB meeting was seen by some as having a lack of southern representation, two new members (Shiva Kumar and Markus Goldstein) have recently joined the IAB following a management committee recommendation in 2016 to review its composition.

### The Technical Advisory Groups (Q8)

TAGs are made up of 6-8 people, with membership drawn from UN agencies, humanitarian organisations, government ministries, research institutions, INGOs, women's and civil society organisations and other relevant stakeholders, working on VAWG, with experience in research and developing policy. Members represent different areas of knowledge and experience, according to the country context, including knowledge of VAWG and gender issues, VAWG in conflict; research uptake; developing research; and developing, implementing and evaluating interventions on VAWG.

The TAG meetings are convened *'when there are issues to discuss or decisions to be made'*,<sup>30</sup> rather than biannually or annually. This ensures that the busy members know that there is something significant for them to do. Attendance is good and the meetings are participatory and facilitated so that all voices are heard. The dynamics of the multi-stakeholder partnerships involved are said, by individual members, to be good, with no obvious source of tension or lack of consensus.

### How programme management and governance influence effectiveness (Q8)

Relations between the three components work well. Contact is on an at-least-monthly basis, with informal contact and communication as and when needed. Coordination and integrated learning across the programme is beginning to take off. The Secretariat, based in MRC Pretoria and staffed by C1 personnel, has no finances or power to require coordination between the components or to offer opportunities (meetings, events) which would promote synergies

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29 KAI at Inception

30 Pers. communication. KAI MTR

between the components. Nevertheless, all components recognise the advantages of synchronising and coordinating their work.

Although the components communicate well, there is little in the programme architecture actively to promote synergies between them at this stage. Component leads have pointed out that each component is working in a different way, with a different constituency and to different ToCs (and log-frames)<sup>31</sup>. Components report separately to DFID. This undermines the components' ability to 'read across' their work to generate thematic findings and/or learn lessons about what works. To date, this has not been a major hindrance, but it will be in the future as more synthesis products are produced and as we start to pull together learning from the multi-component programme. Currently, analysis is done 'at a higher level' (usually component management), and while this is understood and there is awareness of the dangers of creating more meetings and demands, this needs to be balanced against the positive effects of involving projects more in analysis and synthesis of evidence and learning.

#### Box 9: Ownership of Common Strategies

Capacity development and RU strategies span all three components. The Secretariat has little mandate, incentive, or necessary resources to effectively and efficiently play its optimal role for the programme as a whole. The production of a programme-wide Research Uptake Strategy was relatively late (March 2016, presented to IAB September) and not 'owned' by the other Components who had their own, more tailored strategies. Projects developed their own RU plans as early as 2015 but there was no central facilitation to get these approved or operationalised until very late (February 2017). The production of a ToC for RU has been submitted to DFID very recently without time for meaningful discussion with all components that would ensure ownership (March 2017); and a proposal for potential syntheses products that was presented to the IAB was a work in progress that will need cross-programme iterations'.

*Source: KAls and programme documentation, MTR*

There appears to be some inconsistency between projects on how much they are aware of their role within the wider programme. Understandably, greatest awareness has been generated in projects close to the Secretariat (i.e. in South Africa) and in those (for example, Tajikistan, Nepal and Afghanistan) where cross-project learning has been greatest.

#### Management for leverage (Q8)

Stakeholders in the programme are highly experienced in influencing policy and practice with research. The challenge is how to systematise and embed this experience and approach throughout the programme, and how to leverage the strong reputations of the organisations involved in WW.

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<sup>31</sup> ToC and Logframe Workshop, London 30 November 2016.



The Capacity Building Strategy, and its management, makes explicit the ambitions to strengthen RU across C1. At a practical level this has led, for example, to the guidance document on RU (based on the DFID guidelines) so that C1 projects could develop their RU plans; provision of up to 20 days each year per project for Technical Advisors to provide 'demand-driven' support which includes RU and leveraging. Potential leverage is, however, presently limited by contractual arrangements (for example, C2 and C3 are paid by results, which is an impediment to flexible working) and limited resourcing (as noted above, part of the RU, and therefore leveraging, budget has had to be redirected into capacity development).

There is an emerging efficiency in how the programme implementers themselves are being influenced by management and their participation in the programme. Implementers say they understand more about research methodologies and the role of evidence in their work; researchers understand more on how to study end-VAWG interventions in difficult circumstances; different organisations are more adaptable in working with other organisational types and sets of skills. Overall, this increases the status of the programme in the global arena, and increases chances for using leverage.

#### Impact of high staff turnover and changing demands (Q8)

High turnover of staff in both the Secretariat and DFID (C2 had four SROs in the space of one year) has potentially led to a loss in institutional memory and continuity. It has also meant that there has been a lack of consistency and coherence of messaging and priorities from DFID. This has caused frustration and inefficient '*to-ing and fro-ing*' between the programme and DFID. The Secretariat has needed to interrupt what it views (justifiably) as '*real work*', to produce numerous memoranda in response to changing demands over time<sup>32</sup>.

High staff turnover inevitably leads to gaps and delays, as new people "catch up" and establish themselves. Since reduction in turnover can only be hoped for, rather than predicted, both DFID and components need to set out even more strongly what is/can be expected of each other in decision-making processes and gaining approval for new directions etc.. At present, programme management feels that too much time is spent reacting to sudden demands, rather than in responding to clear and consistent directives.<sup>33</sup>

#### The importance of the Annual Scientific Meeting (Q8)

All actors consulted on the subject, spoke of the importance of the ASM: in providing opportunities for sharing and cross-learning. The ASM is an important opportunity to bring the components closer together and to explore possible synergies of working with overlapping mandates. As the programme progresses, the ASM is an occasion when themes relative to all components can be shared, alongside initial findings from research and evaluation. It is a good opportunity to advance a realist evaluation approach for WW: sharing what is working where, when, how and why, and what is working less well.

#### Equity and Intersectionality: reaching the poorest, and most vulnerable (Q9)

The end-VAWG agenda means that the programme is, by definition, reaching highly vulnerable girls, women and men. VAWG draws attention to the need to distinguish carefully between

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32 Pers. communication. KAIs MTR

33 Ibid.

disadvantage and the “usual” measures of vulnerability. Some aspects of vulnerability - for example, living with different abilities, living without secure livelihoods and accommodation – do link to increased vulnerability to VAWG. But VAWG reaches across all social and personal categories.

All the projects supported through WW are reaching disadvantaged and vulnerable people. At this stage, we have not been able to determine whether research is based on disaggregation of degrees/levels of vulnerability within the projects. Some aspects of disaggregation are likely to be missed: because budgets are tight and researchers are not always able to include everything they might want to. For example, the Sonke One Man can project works with men and women in informal settlements in Diepsloot. But the Wiswatersrand research with Sonke works only with men. This means that everything to do with women’s actual experience of violence, and their participation in the project, is missing from the research. All actors know that this is not ideal.

Research taking place in areas of conflict (for example, Afghanistan, South Sudan and Pakistan) show that the programme is meeting its remit to be as inclusive as possible. The nationwide reach of C1’s work in Pakistan, the decision to conduct research in South Sudan (C2 and 3) and also Dadaab (C2) demonstrate this. C1 has selected projects and innovation that reach out into informal and poor settlements (for example, South Africa, Kenya etc.).

#### Box 10: Pakistan: The Stakeholder Environment, Importance of Context

Pakistan represents a highly challenging environment for implementation, research and research uptake for the R2P project. Interviews with non-WW stakeholders and the supporting literature were all clear: VAWG, as an issue, is seen as highly contentious in Pakistan. For example, the Punjab government passed the Women Protection against Violence Bill 2016 but this has been criticised by religious political leaders and clerics, who have suggested that it is against family and un-Islamic. Currently, there is a heated debate going on between the religious parties and the government, on this bill, and it is unclear what the future of this law will be.

**Political & social context** - Pressure from the religious right is not something new, recently, a draft bill on criminalizing child marriages to be presented to the Parliament by a female Member of National Assembly (MNA) had to be withdrawn due to issues raised by the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII), which stated that it contradicts that which is allowed in Islam. Political figures, such as Imran Khan, have now called for the Women Protection Bill of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province to be vetted by the CII before it is presented to the KPK assembly.

**The community, household context** - The challenges facing R2P are also evident: *"The baseline data gives the idea that corporal punishment is still quite common, so R2P may not be accepted in some schools thinking that they are loud and vocal about the teachers"*.

**Uptake expectations must be contextualised given these realities** - Given such a highly volatile environment, with significant risk of backlash, communication of research findings beyond stakeholders directly working to end VAWG must be carefully planned.

*Source: Pakistan Case Study for the MTR*

## 5.5. Efficiency

This section gives an overview of efficiency in relation to funding and VFM. It is not an in-depth budgetary analysis. It also looks at efficiency in how management arrangements facilitate (or not) progress in the programme. Our findings are guided by the agreed efficiency related evaluation questions in [Box 11](#) below.

#### Box 11: Efficiency Related Evaluation Questions

10. Are the implementing partners working to their strengths and comparative advantages so as to achieve all outcomes (including research generation, research uptake and capacity-building)?
11. Are the governance and management structures of the components, and of the overall programme, efficient in line with DFID's '4Es' approach to measuring VFM?
  - To date, what has been the impact on efficiency of the staggered start-up dates for components?
12. Are budget allocations sufficient for component-level and programme-wide activities to

achieve programme objectives?

### 13. What lessons can be learned across the three components to improve value for money of research and innovation programmes?

Funding does not appear to have been made available to the levels necessary to implement the desired emphasis on research uptake.

#### Partners working to their strengths (Q10)

Management of components, and of the Secretariat overall appears to be strong. Partners in the programme have globally respected experience and expertise in the end-VAWG field and are working to their strengths. If it is possible to make the WW programme a success, it seems that it is this combination of management organisations that are best-placed to achieve the outcomes.

Across the wider programme, there is representation of all of the disciplines and expertise(s) needed for stimulating innovation, generating rigorous research, engaging with the key target audiences; repackaging and repurposing the evidence as it is generated; and positioning the body of work *'in the right places at the right time<sup>34</sup>'*. This depends, however, on the right systems, processes, incentives and capacities being in place.

Over the last period, strategies have been refined and the ToC for RU has been developed. Momentum generated through the ASM in Dubai (2016) has been sustained and we are beginning to see a "take-off" in the way that components can work together. This is, in part, stimulated by cross-cutting capacity development and RU strategies, and the development of early findings.

Nevertheless, the Secretariat has less power than initially envisaged. This limits the effective facilitation of the three components, and potentially the lessons to be learned across the evidence portfolio. From the Secretariat's and the components' points of view, the coordination between components works because it is friendly, and there is *'no reason not to get on and share information'*. This is fine, but even if coordination is friendly, informal and *ad hoc*, it needs to be fully embedded in programme systems and structures – to safeguard against staff turnover and loss of institutional memory.

#### VFM Findings (Q11)

Based on a document review and interviews with KAs, VFM achievements across the programme are clear. There has been cost sharing by IPs, use of preferential rates for reimbursables and where possible using events financed by other bodies to promote WW evidence dissemination, for example, the High Level Panel on Women's Economic Empowerment at the IAFFE conference. Beyond basic economy measures, the programme now has a significant capacity development programme, including the TAGs, which at the project level are now seen positively and as a great resource to support in-country work. At the project level, C1 is working with grantees to support cash flow management. Through the Secretariat, a

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34 Pers. communication. KAI MTR

Portfolio Tracker has been designed that supports and facilitates financial performance monitoring.

However, C1 and C3 have both reported that some projects and contractors (Laterite in Rwanda, Eureka in Afghanistan, NUIG staff, ICRW, Ipsos Mori subcontractors and in-country staff, and national researchers) are suffering from the significant impact that Brexit has had on exchange rates, and work is being undertaken across the components to address the impact of this. There needs to be recognition within DFID that the impact is so significant that it is likely to affect component project delivery. We encourage flexibility, together with contingency planning across components.

Other external pressures like Brexit, impact at the project level, as the very environment in which these projects are operating is fragile and can change overnight. Both C2 and C3 faced this challenge, with C2 facing this in South Sudan during the insurgency last year and had to halt activities but successfully planned and worked around the difficulties to avoid financial losses.

### DFID Contract Issues (Q11)

Although DFID believe that the initial costing for the programme was good enough, internally it is recognised that contracting through three separate bids and pushing each bidder to present the best cost for the lowest prices resulted in some over-promising of deliverables. For example, costs per RCT were too low. This echoes the recent performance review by ICAI, of DFID's support to marginalised girls, which criticised DFID for focusing too much on cost-efficiency at the detriment to effectiveness.<sup>35</sup>

*'There is a perceived tension between DFID's responsibility to ensure good value for money, which requires a detailed understanding of the costs of inputs, and the flexibility of fixed price-based results-based contracts. Effective partnership and Consortium management requires DFID and lead contractors to have transparent discussions on these issues.'*

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### VFM Indicators (Q11)

WW is a very complex programme to develop robust VFM indicators against: research costs are vastly different across programmes (economy and efficiency), quantifying the rate of return VFM of research (cost-effectiveness) is complex (and resource intensive). There are also tensions around the ability to measure equity in this space, as this is often seen in direct contrast to the overarching drive for economy VFM. DFID too has recently been criticised by ICAI regarding the focus of its VFM work around marginalised girls: *'the common emphasis on cost-efficiency within DFID's VFM analysis may work against a focus on the marginalised.'*<sup>36</sup> We hope that DFID has taken these critiques on board and remains committed to working with highly vulnerable and marginalised people, especially girls and women, despite the likelihood of heavier and changing upfront costs.

It is important that the drive for VFM cannot come at the expense of quality pieces of research that have been appropriately resourced, as this will ultimately affect impact. Early in WW there were known gaps in reporting on VFM and there has been substantial drive and work within DFID and across components on agreeing a set of VFM indicators. These were finally agreed in

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<sup>35</sup> ICAI (2016), Accessing, staying and succeeding in basic education- UK aid, p.38

<sup>36</sup> ICAI (2016), *ibid.*

late 2016. They need refinement (this is beyond the scope of the MTR). But, given the work already undertaken on VFM and the consensus building that has taken place on this across components, these seem pragmatic indicators to report against. Requiring the Secretariat or individual components to report on anything more beyond this, would be burdensome. The efficiency, effectiveness and equity indicators developed by WW/DFID could clearly be aligned (or part) of logframe reporting (milestones and targets) to avoid the duplication of having to report similar activities for differing results frameworks.

A bigger task, beyond the responsibility of the WW programme, would be a more detailed and systematic study on the rate of return / VFM of VAWG research. DFID could commission this in the future. Designing and testing a methodology to develop the rate of return on DFID's investment in VAWG research, could be of great benefit, not only to the WW programme but also for other research programmes commissioned by DFID and others.

#### RU commitment and resourcing across the programme (Q12)

Commitment is strongly linked to resourcing. We believe that, because a considerable section of the RU resources had to be diverted in capacity development, initial commitments for RU have been negatively affected. There is differential understanding of RU and commitment to uptake across the programme portfolio and much more could be done to share these approaches, and to build on the strengths that exist in the organisations with stronger capacity.

Very late submission of project-level RU plans in the research cycle missed the opportunity to influence the way every project thought about RU from the outset. This is a good moment, at MTR, to reinforce and set a higher bar.

#### Improving synergies for programme-wide VfM (Q13)

In Section 5.4 we addressed the need to strengthen the coordination and learning between components. As this stronger integration develops over the rest of the programme (as we believe it will), greater synergies in effort and outcome will produce good VfM results.

## 5.6. Sustainability

In the following section we provide emerging findings related to the sustainability of the WW programme. Our findings are guided by the agreed sustainability related evaluation questions in Box 12 below.

#### Box 12: Sustainability Related Evaluation Questions

14. To what extent are WW and its components on track to deliver sustainable policy and programme changes, as well as academic outcome changes?
15. What lessons are being learnt on how to design and manage innovation and research programmes that promote change in policy and practice?
16. Is WW on track to build long-term research capacity amongst developing country researchers?

At mid-term, there is little meaningful that can be said about actual sustainability of achievements. Few findings are yet available. However, there are indications that the

programme is on-track towards delivering sustainable policy and programme changes. There are also some caveats.

#### Positive Pathways: Learning lessons for future research and innovation (Q14)

The MTR has found that the WW programme will offer does offer an opportunity to advance global understanding on what combinations of interventions are needed to prevent and end VAWG, [in different contexts](#). The wealth of experience across the programme, and the various different innovation projects and pieces of research, has encouraged us to develop a Positive Pathways Approach.

#### Box 4: Positive Pathways Analysis

Positive Pathways Analysis (PPA) has been designed and developed by the IMC independent Evaluation team in response to a growing need for better understanding of effectiveness and VFM in end-VAWG policy and programming. PPA is a way to synthesise understanding, gained through innovation and research/evaluation programmes/projects, and to identify approaches, and combinations of components, which are most likely to lead to sustained positive change. PPA will provide a fresh approach to assessing the relative merit of different programme components and will contribute to development of a framework for design of future end-VAWG programmes and projects.

The WW programme is set to make a major contribution to the on-going debate on how best to intervene for prevention and ending of VAWG. This is not just in the fact that, through rigorous and robust research and evaluation, it will define which innovations and interventions have worked best, but also in the opportunity it provides for us to work out:

- a) What interventions are essential, and in what combination?
- b) What interventions are desirable? And
- c) What interventions are helpful, but may be seen as added “extras”?

It will also be possible to assess these factors against different contexts and circumstances. Being able to do this will point to sustainability of achievements and will also ensure that a sustainability lens is used in future programming.

#### Using learning beyond the WW programme (Q15)

One of the ways in which we can measure trends towards sustainability, is to assess the extent to which experience and learning, gained through the programme, is being used more widely, beyond the programme confines. This is important because it shows that learning is being institutionalised and generalised – programme and research designers are generalising success factors from particular experience to their wider work. There is evidence that this is happening in WW (see [Box 14](#) for examples of this):

#### Box 14: Case Study Examples

In Pakistan, R2P has diversified beyond WW:

- 2 new programmes in Karachi
- 2 more in Islamabad
- Collaboration with a Sindh education foundation which has provided an opportunity to train teachers in positive child development
- UNICEF has also contracted them to train 500 teachers in KPK Province

In South Africa the WW team (Secretariat and project level) are:

- supporting the roll out of Stepping Stones and Creating Futures by the NGO NACOSA in the Western Cape province of South Africa
- in discussion with USAID about further roll out.

#### Balancing north-south needs (Q16)

The needs of Northern and Southern organisations are not always aligned. In general, Northern organisations know that their good reputation rests on production of high-quality, watertight research results. However, Southern partners may be more interested in disseminating findings quickly – so that they can exert influence, secure further funding etc. This needs recognition and understanding from both sides.

#### Box 15: Dadaab: tensions in interests

In Dadaab, local partners are concerned that the LSHTM team, working on the Dadaab (C2) research, are exercising excessive authority in terms of publication possibilities. For example, local partners have drafted a paper related to the difficulties of conducting this type of research, but it was reported that this has been halted by senior colleagues at LSHTM. It is likely that LSHTM has good reasons for this decision but improved communication in this area would benefit working relationships.

*Source: MTR Case Study (Annex 9)*

#### Changes are clearly emerging (Q16)

A good example of change is C1's work with R2P in Pakistan. One R2P employee talked about the project as follows: *"If the negative aspects (such as bullying and violence) are addressed and girls learn to not tolerate them then they will not be reinforced in the future."*

When asked about successes they went on to say there is: *"Positive impact on boys who realise that girls have a right to play. This view is then communicated by them in their neighbourhood and families. A positive image of masculinity begins to emerge."*



On the R2P programme, when asked how some felt about the research approach some concerns were raised that it was heavily quantitative which risked certain aspects of their work not being captured.<sup>37</sup> For example one actor interviewed stated *'it does not capture the soul of it.'* Concern is that the ways in which girls' are being empowered will not be documented it will only measure or evidence that attitudes have changed rather than *'how they have'*. One of the researchers interviewed explained the approach saying that a RCT design was being use in order to understand whether R2P is effective in addressing: *"bullying, violence amongst children and increasing their self-reliance or not."*

The researcher went on to outline already some of the positive findings about the impact of R2P: *"We see a lot of mental changes happening in children, like gaining confidence, laughing, being active, girls who never got the chance to play, have that now. Also greater more positive teacher involvement for example they now encourage children to reflect after their activities (following the play, reflect and apply model). One big positive thing has been that some girls from the R2P intervention schools have become part of the national cricket team for girls."*

Evidence is already emerging and is delivering impact in terms of greater government interest in support the R2P curriculum across state schools.

Emerging long term research capacity being built but this is not being captured or nurtured as much as it could be (Q16)

Training researchers to collected data on VAWG for the first time was clearly challenging. Interviews with researchers involved in data collection highlighted how much the training was appreciated and its impact in terms of capacity development. One researcher stated *"I knew nothing about VAWG before starting this project and now I know lots. I also understand how to approach researching on what is a complex and highly sensitive topic."*

Highlighting areas where improved practice is needed

The research is highlighting important areas where better practice is needed. These lessons are being acted upon already, but have not been documented by components. For example:

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<sup>37</sup> The programme has an RCT design with researchers undertaking a baseline assessment with 40 school children from the 6th to 8th grade (20 boys, 20 girls – 10 control and 10 intervention).

## Box 16: Risks to Researchers

In Dadaab, recruiting well-educated Somali researchers has been one of the greatest challenges facing the research. The refugee case workers were open about their experiences. The views shared reflected the findings emerging from the research, in particular the need to ensure that the case workers receive the amount of support they need to overcome the challenges they face because of their role. One case worker stated: *"we are constantly at risk of violence because of the work we do. We are accused of working for western imperialists. We also need support, not just the women we help."* At the same time the workers were committed to their role and felt it was important. *"We know what we do is important and this motivates us and drives us on even when things become difficult."* Case workers are at risk from victims' families. If they visit victims' homes, perpetrators are likely to lash out against the caseworker, who is seen to be meddling and *'turning previously good wives against husbands'*. Researchers mitigate this danger somewhat by meeting victims in alternative locations but in this tight-knit community, news of interaction tends to travel quickly and the danger therefore remains. However, from the interviews conducted it is clear that the team has succeeded and managed to build in-country capacity to research VAWG. This should be seen as a major achievement.

*Source: Dadaab case study, MTR*

It is important that this type of process learning is fully documented as it will support sustainability in WW and other research programmes – especially those working on highly sensitive issues, in unstable areas, or where political will to address sensitive issues is low.

## 5.7. Innovation

Innovation is a driving force behind all aspects of the programme. It is what makes the programme bold and ambitious, but it is also the factor which underpins all possibilities for achievement and success.

Many of the projects, themselves, are innovative (innovation grants). Others, whilst using tried and tested approaches, remain innovative because of the relationship between them and the research organisations. There is innovation, too, in the adaptation of an approach such as Stepping Stones, to a new field, new contexts and different modes of implementation. The Stepping Stones approach is now used in 5/6 of the projects. It will be a useful, over the programme and at endline, to monitor and evaluate the success of using Stepping Stones, in adaptation.

*'Building a community of practitioners and academics with a distinct focus and collective motivation is the biggest achievement so far. The programme has sparked new relationships vertically as well as horizontally.'*

MTR KAI

Lessons to be learned about being innovative, in innovative programme architecture, need to be captured and fully documented. This calls for careful documentation of the processes needed to stimulate and protect innovation – in individual projects, between project partners, across

different projects and within, and between, different components. This attention to the process of innovation is, in itself, new and challenging. It requires a strategic approach.

## 5.8. Research Uptake

### The Context for Evidence Use

The quality of an evaluation is an important factor in whether findings are used (in decision-making) but, in a recent internal study commissioned by DFID it was found that evaluation 'quality' is not the key determiner of whether the evidence would be used. Other factors include: including in the evaluation team (or leading them) people who are respected in-country; relationships between the evaluators and those being evaluated; and having a robust influence or research uptake strategy that considers the context for evidence uptake and use.<sup>38</sup>

There is appetite for WW evidence in DFID but the context is the usual for key stakeholders on the programme's key stakeholder list: people are busy and invited to too many meetings; there is a surfeit of information and *'too much noise'*. It is essential that the programme fully exploits the breadth and depth of *'insider knowledge'* of the people and organisations it has, to fully understand and respond tactically to the *'demand side'* of how decisions are being made, when and by whom.

### Context of Evidence Use - In Humanitarian Contexts Specifically

DFID is ground-breaking in its spend and pursuit of evidence for ending VAWG in humanitarian settings – the most difficult topic in the most difficult context. Within the context of growing UK government spend on humanitarian aid – the trebling of DFID spend on humanitarian emergencies from £433m to nearly £1.3bn in last five years<sup>39</sup> - this is increasingly important work.

There is a *'double burden'* standing in the way of evidence use: first the politicised nature of ending VAWG and for C2, its pursuit in a humanitarian setting where the factors needing to be in place for practitioners to access, understand and use evidence are largely absent. In these circumstances, other exogenous factors are likely to have greater weight in final policy outcomes than research evidence, however powerful. This is why it is practical and pragmatic to seek evidence of *'evidence-informed policy and practice'* and to take signals from the ambitions of the components themselves as to what are reasonable and likely outcomes as the milestones for the six monthly check-ins.

Usual best practice requirements for any communications or engagement need to be present: to be kept simple and *'operational'* (or to draw clear lessons relevant for operational programming); presenting a mix of simple, clear documents with workshops (and if running the latter, make sure people have *'some findings to hold in paper form'* on their laps before the workshop starts; presentations 'bag lunch equivalent) to an already interested group pulling out

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38 MTR KAI.

39 <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2016/jan/21/uk-spending-humanitarian-support-record-high-13bn-national-audit-office-report-dfid>

clear findings that resonate with their area of work and use the opportunity to identify e.g. *'three things that they want to know more about'* which can inform the WW synthesis products.<sup>40</sup>

### WW Programme RU Strengths and Weaknesses

The individuals brought together by the programme are deeply experienced and have undoubted capacity around how to influence policy and practice with research as part of a broader change agenda. The challenge will be how to **systematise** and **embed** both this knowledge and approach to the whole programme; and how to leverage the enormous reputational assets of the organisations involved. As part of the MTR, we reviewed WW and component uptake strategies and engagement, these are found in depth in [Annex 10](#).

*"The story triggers attitude change, but to influence a whole field you need a broader body of evidence"*

*"You need the truth because of who controls the definition of what is evidence"*

*"We won the battle of 'this is important' but we need to follow this up with the story and the substantial evidence to explain why and how"*

*Lori Heise*

### Six elements of success (presented to IAB by C2 Dubai 2016)

1. Really understanding the policy environment at the time and what's the appetite for change;
2. Be really specific and targeted in what you want to achieve;
3. Build and maintain relationships with key stakeholders and start that relationship as early as possible;
4. Identify 'the right information' to present to different audiences (and be innovative with the methods of communication if your evidence isn't very strong);
5. Work in a coalition so any single organisation can't be accused of self-interest;
6. Follow up.

There is an explicit use of TAGs in each country to advise on each of the three levels at which WW takes place; project, component and programme level. There is recognition of the varying roles that these fora can play; to critique research and findings as they emerge; to feed in aspects of 'the demand side' for the research; to use the individuals to advocate for the WW portfolio in their own organisations and spheres of influence.

### Research Uptake Capacity

RU and capacity development for RU was discussed in the initial capacity development workshop in January 2015 followed by limited support provided to grantees for RU. However, with a loss of this support through the departure of team member in late 2015 and the resultant gap until a RU Manager was in place in September 2016 meant there was a gap in support and coordination in this area. The Capacity Building Strategy and management has made explicit the ambitions to strengthen RU across C1. At a practical level this has produced e.g. guidance document on RU based on the DFID guidelines for C1 projects to develop their RU plans;

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<sup>40</sup> MTR KAI.

provision of up to 20 days each year per project for Technical Advisors to provide 'demand-driven' support which includes RU (although it is unclear how well briefed/expert the TAs are around this deliverable).

Very late submission of project-level RU plans in the research cycle missed the opportunity to influence the way every project thought about RU from the outset. It is a good time at the MTR to reinforce and set a higher bar in this area.

## 5.9. Conclusions

As the overarching findings at the beginning of [Section 5](#) indicated, WW is a programme with high potential to shape the future end-VAWG agenda. It is on-track to meet its milestones and targets, and its outcomes.

Nevertheless, and not unexpectedly, such a complex the programme meets many hurdles and has needed to overcome barriers. It is a tribute to management that it has managed to do so. There are areas in which the programme can be strengthened. Several of these are based on the growing understanding of exactly what it takes to put WW into practice. Key recommendations for strengthening are given in [Section 6](#).

## 6 Recommendations: Opportunities for Strengthening Programme Approach

This section presents a limited set of recommendations for strengthening the programme:

### 6.1. Recommendations

#### General and Management

1. Ensure the Annual Scientific Meeting (ASM) is designed in ways which will promote synergies between the three programme components

All stakeholders consulted spoke of the benefits of the ASM. The meeting presents an opportunity for stakeholders to discover more about the wider programme, share experiences and make comparisons across projects, countries and components. The time is right for the meeting to do more to create synergies between components – devoting time during the meeting to over-arching, thematic issues, can promote this. The Secretariat has also proposed that the meeting might be an opportunity to present and share a small series of “working papers” (our title) on issues emerging through WW.

2. Develop a strategic approach to capturing the processes of innovation across the whole programme

All actors involved in ending VAWG, and all those involved in innovative research programmes, can benefit from understanding the full processes of innovation within WW. We suggest that a cross-component group – comprising actors at all levels – develop and implement a strategy to capture innovation as it works in the programme, and to share this to all different audiences.

3. Identify and support champions in each country

The WW programme has many champions. However, there is still room to strengthen the use that is made of them (see also [Annex 13](#)). Champions in each country are vital to push the programme agenda and to ensure its visibility. Champions can be the link between the implementation, research and RU worlds, and can be instrumental in creating demand for WW products. We need to generate demand through getting information out to key constituencies and the use of champions who can leverage their own networks could support this. It is happening to a certain extent but more could be done by being more explicit and purposeful about using champions as a RU tactic. Evidence emerging from other DFID-funded programmes using this device to raise visibility and engagement suggests a number of factors that optimise their effectiveness:

- Champions work at all levels of policy and practice often assuming different roles at key moments in time;
- Champions are firmly rooted within social structures (trust, reputation etc.) so stakeholder mapping exercises could be used to identify and understand the context;
- Champions are motivated by a wide range of factors (intrinsic/extrinsic) so engagement strategies need to be tailored; and,
- Different leadership qualities are required depending on the shape and maturity of the network.

## Research

4. Develop strategies to share, whenever and wherever possible, findings of research as soon as they emerge and catalyse the widest possible range of actor and strengthen the Community of Practice.

We understand the tension between the need for high-reputation research organisations to present only "*finished findings and analyses*" and the desires of implementers to "*get on with it*". It will be beneficial to develop the idea of dissemination of research-in-progress and working papers/blogs/other products on issues which affect implementation and research. Early sharing of findings catalyses a wider range of actors, strengthens the CoP raises visibility and increases leverage. It also helps to maintain interest in the research.

5. Encourage intra-country and cross-country drafting and editing of outputs to increase both the number of products and the cooperation between north and south

Involving southern partners as much as possible in the production of the research also helps to increase their own, and their governments' interests and appetite for evidence. The movement against VAWG is increasingly led by southern women, with the support of highly committed southern men. As the programme is aware, it is vital that these people feel ownership in VAWG – in its implementation and products. There is good cooperation between northern and southern actors, but this does not seem always to translate into co-authored products. There were statements to the effect that local partners had been blocked from pursuing publications by UK-based researchers, who preferred to wait for more data to emerge. This does not necessarily indicate problematic north-south power imbalances, but does point towards a need to better negotiate publication arrangements to ensure that no negative perceptions remain. Local partners produce blogs etc., but perhaps there could be more emphasis on arranging co-authorship of higher level products (even if these are planned for later dates).

## Research Uptake

6. Promote the IAB and TAGs as active champions of Research Uptake and appoint an RU expert to the Independent Advisory Board

The idea of appointing an RU expert to the IAB has been discussed between DFID and the programme. We fully support this move and believe such an appointment would have real practical benefits – not only in terms of technical input, but also in ensuring that available resources can be used for RU (we understand that it is unlikely that new RU funding can be made available). We understand also that the TAGs are firm supporters of WW, but we feel that even more can be made of their expertise in, for example, opening and maintaining channels of communication with organisations important for promotion of RU (see [Annex 13](#)).

7. Ensure that DFID takes on its responsibilities for driving RU and promoting WW in the political spaces where it has leverage

As a global leader and investor in ending VAWG, DFID has strong roles and responsibilities to play in keeping end-VAWG on the international political agenda and using its leverage – both in the UK and abroad. A global summit on VAWG, hosted by the UK, would demonstrate commitment and set an important challenge in the current, political, global climate, where women's and girls' rights to well-being are under challenge.

#### 8. Strengthen the RU Mandate in the components and ensure adequate resourcing

For the programme to be serious in pursuing its RU goals, RU needs enough budget and adequate resources. The Secretariat needs a mandate, authority and leverage to take the programme to a higher level around RU for the remainder of the programme period. The RU position in the Secretariat will work best if it is at Directorial level and has the power and capacity to guide, direct and facilitate on all aspects of RU. Currently, this is not the case and components are only just coming to terms with what is required to make RU as strong as it needs to be. The Secretariat needs to work very closely with all components and to have the power to convene around RU issues (see the "How To" note on RU presented as [Annex 13](#)).

#### 9. Strengthen the public facing platform and make more aggressive and concerted use of 'cost neutral' communications channels such as social media.

The programme needs to target and market better in its knowledge or / and strategic approach to different audiences. Where will most gains be made? And at what stage? Which are the debates around which WW can use evidence to engage and who are the key actors/intermediaries who could be useful communication partners and advocates? As part of this:

- Encourage/enable individual researchers to set up google alerts for their project level working papers; individual learning papers etc.; build monitoring data into overall WW uptake metrics.
- Facilitate meetings between decision-makers and researchers to identify, realistically, what will be learnt in research and what different policy and practice audiences want to know. This could be part of the next ASM.

### Monitoring and Evaluation

#### 10. Discuss the proposed revisions to the over-arching ToC and logframe and ensure ownership by all components

The over-arching ToC and logframe are important because it is against them that the programme will, ultimately, be judged. It is fine for each component to work to its own results framework [as long as](#) these can nest under the over-arching DFID framework. Otherwise there is a very real danger that the fullness of work carried out by the programme and the richness of its successes, will not be recognised. This has happened in other complex programmes, and it is common failing in many programmes dealing (ultimately) with gender equality and equity and with social change. The evaluation team will present a slightly revised ToC and logframe which is intended to capture all key and aspects of programme work, including those – like capacity development – which have arisen since the beginning of programme implementation. The ToC will then need to be agreed and accepted by DFID and the programme.

#### 11. Strengthen M&E for assessment of impact and sustainability

Alongside the need to capture processes which underpin the programme (innovation) and facilitate its progress towards goals, we also needs to develop innovative ways to capture impact and sustainability. Positive Pathways Analysis is a step towards this, is documentation of the use of WW learning in wider implementation and research arenas. The evaluation team will also offer some suggestions to the Secretariat on simple ways to organise qualitative



information generated through the programme – for example, the “WOW!” stories being collected. A body of easily accessible and categorised, illustrative qualitative data can be developed.

#### 12. Tracking WW impact within DFID internally through the VAWG helpdesk

The WW programme is well positioned to support internal learning and evidence use within DFID around VAWG, with the VAWG helpdesk highlighted during the MTR as a useful vehicle to channel WW evidence. If not already undertaken systematically, tracking of how the evidence is being used by DFID advisers (i.e. designing new programmes, business cases or supporting project re-designs) would be helpful to ensure that all the positive influences of the WW programme are being recorded. This could also help to support DFID’s response to ICAI’s follow up study on VAWG later this year.

## 7 WW Evaluation Next Steps

### Communication of evaluation findings

As part of the evaluation we will:

1. Produce a one and three-page summary of MTR, including infographics, and provide materials to the WW programme to communicate this to their audiences, including through the programme e-newsletter.
2. Present the findings to the IAB at the ASM<sup>41</sup>
3. Evaluation Team (and WW programme as a facilitated/critical friend role?) to populate table prepared to identify [these strategic targets](#) for the MTR findings that would assist the programme in meeting outreach/influence objectives.
4. Make available bibliographies and literature reviews.
5. Present evaluation at UKES and similar evaluation for a.

### About Research Uptake Learning Specifically

More specifically around research uptake learning, we will:

- Discuss the “How To” Note on RU, presented as [Annex 13](#) with the Secretariat
- Facilitate discussion at the ASM CB sessions, if invited, around learning from innovation and on RU
- Build and facilitate conversation with the WW programme actors through a dedicated (private) Dialogue Space on [Research To Action](#):
  - Produce 1pp summary of the findings around RU and publish
  - Host a webinar (as part of the regular CB CoP sessions) to discuss strengths, identify weaknesses and facilitate conversation to share possible solutions/bring in external experiences
  - Commission two blogs and maintain dialogue space on R2A

We will also use the R2A Forum to stimulate peer-learning across the programme around RU and with other programmes and researchers doing similar work.

### Attendance at the ASM

Given the importance ascribed by all stakeholders to the ASMs, we feel it important that the evaluation team can continue to attend these and contribute as part of the WW programme. WE believe that our attendance is vital if we are to continue to make valuable contributions on the programme and so as to build and maintain trust with all relevant actors.

### Six monthly check-ins

The IE team, has the advantage of being able to look at the “bigger picture” in a way that the programme components cannot. We intend to use this advantage to work with the programme in drawing out lessons and shaping refinements: particularly around innovation and RU. We hope to maintain some sort of continual relation with the programme (though, of course, we don't have the resources for major input – but we can keep up communication, read the website

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<sup>41</sup> Please note that the evaluation team's attendance at future ASM's is dependent on further resources being allocated to the evaluation and agreement from the WW programme.

etc.). The 6-monthly check-ins are more reflection and learning points than check-ups. We think this is important as we have learned (through work on other evaluations – ECM Amhara, SFFGC Sudan) that, without possibilities for continual communication, we are forced to rely on informal, “friendly” relations between implementation team members and IE team members to preserve trust and understanding.

Three six monthly check-ins are planned (September 2017, March 2018, September 2018). For these, we will develop a suite of uptake indicators in consultation with the programme, based on an amalgamation of the following:

- *‘What success looks like’* questions asked during the evaluation KAIs to date
- Statements that reflect the staging posts along the agreed uptake pathways (derived from the programme’s overarching ToC and ToC for RU)

We will develop an infographic template that curates and presents the agreed indicators across all three components, and use this to report six-monthly check-ins. At each stage, we will convene discussions with key personnel within the programme, to ‘sensemake’ what is emerging as part of the ‘critical friend’ approach of the evaluation. We will communicate the findings to a wider community working on, and interested in ending VAWG to stimulate discussion and peer-critiquing of the evidence and the extent to which it is influencing policy and practice worldwide.

## References

Please note that through the document audit undertaken as part of the MTR, our findings were informed by available WW project documentation including programme and component Annual Review, Reports, Quarterly Report, RU Strategies etc.

Explicit references include:

1. DFID's (2011), Ethics Principles for Research and Evaluation, available at: [https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/67483/dfid-ethics-prcpls-rsrch-eval.pdf](https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/67483/dfid-ethics-prcpls-rsrch-eval.pdf)
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